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ABSRTRACT
The purpose of this thesis was to examine the dividend policy views of corporate managers of 
listed Finnish companies. The managers were asked to fill up a questionnaire containing 
questions about three topics: (1) the relationship between dividend policy and value, (2) 
explanations of dividend relevance including the bird-in-the-hand, signalling, tax-induced 
clientele/clientele effect and agency explanations and (3) how firms determine the amount of 
dividends to pay. These were topics were covered by 29 theoretical and empirical statements.
The second purpose of the thesis was to find out the factors that managers consider most 
important in determining their firm’s cash dividend policy as well as to find out which 
companies use target payout ratio and what is the average target payout for Finnish companies. 
Also one goal was to compare the results with the results of earlier studies abroad.
The second chapter reviews the various messages being transmitted by the academic literature 
on dividends. First, the irrelevancy of dividends is being discussed. Next possible reasons for 
paying and not paying dividends are under consideration. Finally, behavioural models and 
especially Lintner’s classic partial adjustment study are covered.
The survey design is provided on chapter three. The final sample consisted of 54 companies 
which were listed on the main list in Helsinki Stock Exchange. The response rate was 
satisfactory nearly 60 %. This chapter also contains detailed clarification of gathering the data 
as well as possible limitations of the study.
The fourth chapter reveals the results of the study. First, the demographic characteristics of the 
respondents and the use of target payouts in Finnish companies are presented. Next the issues 
involving dividend policy and the explanations of dividend relevance are shown. The 
descriptive statistics showing the importance level of each of 22 factors are presented after 
presenting how the firms set the amount of dividends that they pay. Finally, the sample is split 
into four groups using two different criteria. Then the opinions of these groups are compared to 
see if there are statistically significant differences between these groups.
The last chapter contains concluding remarks. About one half of the companies use target 
payout ratio and the average ratio is 40 %. Most of the respondents believed that dividend 
policy affects firm value which has been acknowledged by several foreign studies. The 
respondents generally had the highest level of agreement with statements involving signalling 
and they also believed that investors preference for dividends changes during investors’ life- 
cycle. For other issues e.g. Bird-in-the-hand, agency and tax-preference explanations the 
respondents’ opinions were uncertain. When the opinions of four groups were compared only 
few statements differed significantly.
The results show that the most important determinants of a firm’s dividend policy were the 
level of current and past earnings. Also continuity of past dividends and expected future 
earnings were highly ranked.
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1. Introduction
There have been a long lasting debate of dividends for over four decades. Especially the 
effect of dividend policy on a corporations market value is a subject of long-standing 
controversy. Still the question of the optimal dividend policy if there is any remains 
unanswered. Many financial economists have set up theoretical models of corporate 
dividend behaviour. However, none of these models has well been able to explain 
observed behaviour.
The empirical evidence of these studies have been more or less in conflict with one to 
another. Some researchers find that dividends which are defined as the distribution of 
corporate earnings to the shareholders of the firm in proportion to their ownership, and 
more specifically, increases in dividends have a positive effect on shareholder’s wealth. 
On the other hand, several studies argue that with introduction of taxes and transaction 
costs, the most desirable policy is to pay zero dividends. There are also theories which 
state that two arbitrarily chosen dividend policies have equivalent consequences, both in 
the absence of taxes and in their presence and, therefore, making the dividends 
irrelevant. As a result our understanding of why corporations pay dividends is currently 
unsatisfactory.
1.1 The motivation of the study
In Finland there are not many published papers dealing with the divided dilemma. 
Because the theory seems not be able to give us unambiguous solution to the dividend 
problem it is interesting to see how the management of Finnish corporations are viewing 
their dividend policy decisions. In Finland the total cash dividends to shareholders paid 
by listed companies have varied in recent years. During the final stages of last economic 
boom in 1989 companies paid close to 4 billion marks in dividends (Kauppalehti, 
12.3.1999). During the recession the development of dividends were fairly moderate but 
after mid 1990’s the cash dividends have grown steadily. In 1997 over 6,2 billion marks 
were paid in dividends and a year later 11,1 billion marks were distributed to 
shareholders in dividends (Kauppalehti, 12.3.1999). Almost 16 billion marks are
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expected to be paid from last years profits in dividends in 1999 (Kauppalehti, 
12.3.1999). The growth in dividend numbers is not only due to increased profitability 
and a trend to pay out more to shareholders but also because the number of publicly 
listed companies has risen. The expanding amounts of money involved in cash 
dividends should arise shareholders awareness of the possible consequences of different 
dividend policies.
1.2 The purpose of the study
The first objective in this paper is to examine the dividend policy views of corporate 
managers of listed Finnish companies. The managers are asked to fill up a questionnaire 
containing questions about three topics: (1) the relationship between dividend policy 
and value, (2) explanations of dividend relevance including the bird-in-the-hand, 
signalling, tax-preference, and agency explanations, and (3) how firms determine the 
amount of dividends to pay. To be more accurate, I ask managers to define the level of 
their agreement on 29 theoretical and empirical issues about dividend policy. Reviewing 
these issues is important to determine to what extent corporate managers agree with the 
various messages being transmitted by the academic literature on dividends.
The second purpose of this thesis is to provide insight into the dividend decision making 
in Finnish listed companies. I want let managers reveal their critical decision variables 
what they consider most important factors in determining their firm’s cash dividend 
policy. To be more specific, I ask managers to value 22 different factors that can be 
expected to have important influence on firm’s dividend policy.
To help understand the large variety of dividend policies that exist I will focus on 
different theoretical issues. However, the object is not to find out whether there is a 
optimal dividend policy which maximises shareholders wealth rather to contribute 
theoretical background to the different aspects that managers might take into account 
while making their firm’s dividend decisions.
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Due to the fact that this study is very closely related to one study from British markets 
by Allen (1992) and four other studies conducted in United States1 the third objective is 
to compare the determinants and the views of divided policy today in Finland with the 
results of earlier studies abroad. This gives an excellent opportunity to see whether there 
are any cultural differences in the divided phenomenon from one country to another as 
Frankfurter (1992) claims.
1.3 Terminology
Through out this paper I will be using words shareholder and stockholder 
interchangeably. Also, a term maximising shareholder’s wealth will be used. 
Maximising principle states that corporate managers should maximise the market value 
of the firm (the price of the stock) in order to maximise shareholder’s wealth.
1.4 The structure of the study
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. In the succeeding section I will discuss 
several theoretical views whether firms should pay dividends or not and how firms 
determine the amount of dividends that they pay. In the section 3 the research design of 
the study is supplied. The results of the questionnaire and comparison with related 
studies are presented in section 4. The final section offers the concluding remarks and 
suggestions for further study.
1 J. Lintner (1965), К. Baker, E. Farelly and B. Edelman (1985), К. Baker and G. Powell (1998,1999)
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2. Dividend Policy: Theory
2.1 Dividend neutrality
As mentioned in introduction dividends have puzzled scientists for nearly four decades. 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) were one of the first to deal with the problem in the 
finance literature. In their paper they created an ideal economy to examine the effects of 
differences in dividend policy on the current price of shares. The ideal economy was 
characterised by perfect capital markets, rational behaviour and perfect certainty.
Next, I will list the precise meaning of these assumptions in accordance with Miller and 
Modigliani (1961):
• In perfect capital markets, no buyer or seller of securities is large enough to affect the 
market price of a security.
• All traders have equal and costless access to information available.
• There are no brokerage fees or other transaction costs when securities are sold, 
bought or issued.
• Also, the taxes are excluded in the perfect capital markets.
Rational behaviour means that investors always prefer more wealth to less and are 
indifferent as to whether the gain increment to their wealth takes the form of cash 
payments or an increase in the market value of their holdings of shares.
Perfect certainty implies that the future investment program and the future profits of 
every corporation are known by every investor. With the help of these assumptions 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) were able to draw following conclusions in the following 
part.
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2.1.1 Irrelevancy of dividends
In the ideal world Miller and Modigliani (1961) were able to conclude that the current 
value of the firm is independent of its current dividend decision. What is gained by 
stockholders in increased dividends is offset exactly by the terminal value of their stock. 
The firm can choose any dividend policy without affecting the stream of cash flows 
received by shareholders. It could determine to pay dividends in excess of cash flows 
from operations and still be able to undertake any planned investment. The extra funds 
needed are supplied by issuing new equity. On the other hand, it could elect to pay 
dividends less than the amount of cash left over from the operations after making the 
investments. The excess cash would be used to repurchase shares. This form of 
reasoning helps to understand Miller and Modigliani’s proposition that value of the firm 
is unaffected by the company’s dividend policy. In addition to this they showed that the 
value must also be unaffected by any future dividend decisions as well which is 
discussed next.
2.1.2 Irrelevancy of dividends under uncertainty
Miller and Modigliani (1961) took a further step from the ideal world of certainty to one 
of uncertainty where the total returns, investments or dividends can no longer be treated 
as known figures. Instead investors must regard them as random variables. The best 
estimate for total return is only the probability distribution of possible returns. Despite 
the uncertainty about these elements they showed that dividend irrelevance conclusion 
need not be modified.
They proved it with the assistance of two hypothetical firms which are believed by 
current investors to have identical future streams of total earnings and total investments. 
The same is assumed to hold for total future dividend payments as well. The current 
dividend payout is the only possible way the firms differ from one to another. According 
to Miller and Modigliani (1961) the terminal values of the firms under symmetric 
market rationality can depend only on prospective future earnings, investments and
10
dividends which are assumed to be identical. Thus, the end-of-period values of the two 
firms must be the same.
Shown that differences in current dividend do not affect current value must the 
beginning-of-period values of the companies be equal. Reaching a point where current 
and future values between the firms are identical follows it logically that the current 
valuation is unaffected by differences in dividend payments in any future period and 
thus that dividend policy is irrelevant for the determination of market prices under 
uncertainty as well. The value of the firm depends only on the distribution of future cash 
flows provided by investment decisions which are completely independent of dividend 
policy as Miller and Modigliani (1961) stress.
The irrelevance position solely argues that a change in dividend policy, given 
investment policy, alters only the timing of the future dividends not their present value 
or the total returns to shareholders. The postponement of dividends is a matter of 
indifference to a rational investor who prefers capital gains as much as dividends.
2.1.3 Supporting evidence
Modigliani and Miller’s pathfinding paper appears to be supported by some empirical 
studies. Black and Scholes (1974) applied a methodology which allowed them to test 
whether expected returns on high yield common stocks differ from expected return on 
low yield common stocks either before or after taxes. They argue that to test the effects 
of dividend yield on stock returns is the best method for testing the effects of dividend 
policy on stock prices.
They constructed 25 portfolios with different divided yields and by investigating these 
portfolios they were able to conclude that “investor has little to go on in deciding how to 
take yield into account in making his investment decisions. He doesn’t know whether 
high yield stocks have higher or lower expected returns than low yield stocks with the 
same risk.” They also demonstrated that dividend yield results carry over to payout 
ratios as well. Because it was impossible to show that different dividend yields lead to
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differences in stock prices, follows that it is impossible to show that a change in 
dividend policy has any definite, long-term effect on stock prices.
Black and Scholes (1974) made their conclusions based on returns without taking into 
account any taxes that the investor might pay on dividends or realised capital gains. This 
suggests that the results have a direct connection to tax-exempt investors only. A tax- 
exempt investor may not gain significantly by emphasising high yield stocks over low 
yield stocks, other things being equal. Moreover, they showed that any investor who is 
trying to maximise the expected after-tax return for given level of risk may ignore 
dividends and concentrate instead on improving his portfolio diversification. It is much 
more likely that he can reduce his risk by improving his diversification than that he can 
increase his expected return by emphasising stocks with a given level of dividend yield.
An alternative method for testing the relationship between dividend policy and the 
capitalised value of the firm was developed by Jose and Stevens (1989). They 
investigated how equilibrium dividend policy characteristics, along with their time- 
series properties affect a firm’s Tobin q ratio2 in the long run. They criticise the 
empirical tests which apply short run measures and dividend yield for ignoring basic 
dividend policy characteristics such as the firm’s average long run payout ratio, payout 
ratio trend, stability of dividends and the stability of the payout ratio. The long run 
equilibrium used to measure q avoids short term event measurement problems and 
potential disequilibrium adjustments that may have affected the results of previous 
studies Jose and Stevens (1989) continue. The Tobin’s q ratio exceeds one in 
equilibrium if management of a firm’s assets and liabilities attracts market premium. By 
using capital market valuation of a firm’s rents, q implicitly incorporates systematic 
risk and captures potential preferences of investors for the dividend policy of the firm 
without specifying a valuation model. Tax laws, accounting methods, and potential 
deviations of nominal and real values are assumed to be discounted appropriately in an 
efficient market and captured by q.
2 A firm’s Tobin q ratio is defined as the market value divided by replacement value of firms assets which measures 
capitalised excess value achieved by the management of the firm’s assets.
12
The time series regressions for the payout ratio, dividends per share, and yield of each 
362 firms were executed to estimate the respective trend and stability measures. The 
findings suggested that market valuation premiums are associated with stable and 
positive dividend per share trends, regardless of the payout ratio level. This in turn 
supports the classic irrelevance of dividend policy hypothesis that the levels and trends 
of payout ratios are not associated with market value premiums.(Jose and Stevens, 
1989)
2.2 Against dividends
In their 1961 article Miller and Modigliani developed a world which is definitely not 
comparable with the situations in the real world. If attention is turned to the real world 
situations, empirical evidence is found that market imperfections and inefficiencies 
make the dividend policy to matter to corporate managers.
2.2.1 Dividends and taxes
Taxes represent substantial market imperfections and there are considerable differences 
between tax laws in distinct countries. In U.S. where most of the dividend research has 
been conducted, the taxation regarding dividends and capital gains has fluctuated 
extensively in past. Before the Tax Reform Act of 1986 there was a dramatic difference 
between the taxation of dividends and capital gains. At that time the net income of the 
large, publicly held corporations were subject to progressive tax rates that rather quickly 
reached 46 % Without minor exceptions investors that received any dividends paid by 
corporation from its current or accumulated past after-tax profits, were also taxed at 
progressive rates under the personal income tax laws. In 1986 the maximum income 
rates peaked at 50 % but the rates had been as high as 92 % during and immediately 
after the World War П according to Miller (1986).
An individual investor avoided personal income taxes if a corporation did not pay 
dividends, but retained the after-tax earnings in the firm. The retained earnings increase
13
the value of the shares because no dividends are paid which follows that there is no drop 
in value at the ex-dividend day. On the presumption that the share sold at a price greater 
than its original price, the accrued capital gains were subject to capital gain tax. The 
rates applied to realised capital gains were never higher than those on ordinary income. 
Typically maximum rates on capital gains were for much of the post war era around 25 
%, so the maximum spread between the top rate on ordinary income and on capital gains 
could have been as much as 67 percentage points says Miller (1986). Taken together, the 
era before tax reform placed a substantial penalty on dividends as opposed to retained 
eamings/capital gains.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 equalised the explicit tax rates of two types of income. 
However, this state was only a transitory period because this gap started to open up 
again due to changes in the U.S. tax code in 1990 and in 1993. In the middle of 1990’s 
the tax rate on capital gains for most shareholders was 28 %, whereas dividends were 
taxed at ordinary income rates which varied from 31 % for investors earning above 
$55,100 up to 39,6 %. (Brealey and Myers, 1996 p. 432)
Later the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 created several different tax rates that depend on 
holding period and taxpayer’s marginal tax rate. The maximum tax rate on capital gains 
was further reduced from 28 % to 20 % for individuals in the top tax rate bracket and, 
for certain lower income taxpayers, from 15 % to 10 %. As under prior law, net short 
term capital gains3 remained taxable at ordinary income tax rates (15 % to 39,6 %). 
Capital gains from the sale of assets held more than a year but not more than 18 months 
are taxed at a maximum rate of 28%. And, finally long-term gains are taxed at a 
maximum rate of 20 % with the exception that if they were taxed as ordinary income 
subject to tax at a 15 % rate, the rate applied to capital gains would be 10 %. 
(http ://www .henderco .com/cgains .html)
It has been argued by several authors that capital gains contain a valuable timing option 
when a firm retains earnings as opposed to paying dividends. A stockholder may defer 
the capital gains tax until the actual sale of stock. For an extreme cases when 
appreciated securities are given as gifts to charitable causes or if the person dies, the
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capital gains tax may be avoided altogether. In these cases the effective present value of 
capital gains taxes is zero.
The above proposition is attacked by Miller and Scholes (1978) who argue it is possible 
for investors to construct comparable shield against paying taxes on dividends. Their 
reasoning was that a stockholder borrows a sufficient amount of funds to produce one 
dollar of interest expense for each dollar of dividend income. The amount borrowed is 
invested in a single payment annuity or some other type of tax favoured investment. The 
interest expense is offset against dividend income, so the investor pays no immediate 
tax. The capital gain on the investment of the borrowed funds is sheltered. If this gain is 
postponed until the time of death, no capital gains tax would be paid. This would lead 
towards the neutrality of dividends.
However, this genius idea by Miller and Scholes (1978) has been critized by difficulties 
to carry it out. At that time as Feenberg (1981) points out there were regulations that 
limit to what extend interests are deductible and the special circumstances under which 
this could occur applied to recipients of about 2,5 % of dividend income. Furthermore, 
performing such actions would include transaction costs which make it even more 
questionable.
2.2.2 Tax induced clienteles
The concept of tax induced clienteles lies on assumption that an individual investor tries 
to maximise multi-period utility and faces a problem of allocating resources over time 
and between different securities. With such market imperfections as transaction costs 
and taxes, the investor will select the optimal level of consumption and the optimal 
investment portfolio in view of the influence of these factors on net returns and the level 
of wealth. The higher an individual’s tax bracket, the more likely he or she is to want 
the firm to invest cash flows internally instead of paying dividends. The low tax bracket 
shareholders have a higher opportunity cost for internally generated funds which raises
3 Short term capital gains consists of profits from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for one year 
or less.
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the cost of deferring dividends. Thus, they want to receive dividends and not spend all 
capital on real investments. (Copeland and Weston, 1988 p. 563)
Elton and Gruber (1970) attempted to measure potential tax induced clientele effect by 
observing the average price decline when the stock goes ex-dividend. They argued that 
in a rational market the fall in price on the ex-dividend day should reflect the value of 
dividends vis-à-vis capital gains to the marginal shareholder. The evidence found 
suggests that on ex-dividend days stock prices fall by an amount smaller than the 
dividend per share which is consistent with the view that investors value dividends less 
than capital gains because of the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains. 
Furthermore, they found that the price change relative to the dividend per share was 
positively correlated with the dividend yield, which could be expected if investors in 
high tax brackets hold low dividend yield stocks and vice versa. This is confirming 
evidence for tax-induced clientele effect in accordance with Elton and Gruber (1970).
However, Kalay (1982) has argued that it is not possible to infer investor clientele tax 
rates from the size of average price decline when the stock goes ex-dividend. This is 
because the average price decline would be bounded by transaction costs, not marginal 
tax rates.
As Elton and Gruber (1970) note there is a reason to believe that shareholders with 
different personal tax rates will not unanimously agree on the firm’s investment and 
dividend decisions. This lack of unanimity can be diminished somewhat if investors 
self-select into tax induced clienteles with low tax bracket individuals purchasing shares 
of high-dividend firms and vice versa. However, as Pettit (1977) points out these 
tendencies may be more than offset once transactions costs of buying and selling 
securities to meet time preferences are introduced. An individual with higher marginal 
tax rate on dividends may still choose a portfolio with high dividend paying 
characteristics if desires for current consumption weigh heavily in the decision process 
and if transactions costs make portfolio liquidation an expensive medium for securing 
the desired level of consumption.
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The purpose of Pettit’s (1977) article was to provide the first direct evidence on the 
relative demand for dividend paying securities by individual investor induced by the 
transactions costs incurred in allocating resources over time and the differences in the 
rates at which capital gains and dividends are taxed. Variables measuring the 
individual’s time preferences, tax rate structure and portfolio risk were used to explain 
the cross sectional variability of investors’ portfolio dividend yields. Pettit included in 
his study 914 responses covering respondents demographic attributes, methods of 
making investment decisions as well their expectations for returns from investments in 
securities. From these responses he selected variables to represent the explanatory 
variables in the equation to be estimated. The data also included portfolio position for 
each individual.
The model he created assumes that investors plan their portfolio decisions based on tax 
rate differences on dividends and capital gains and the time preferences in the face of 
transaction costs. The evidence suggests that there is a significant tax induced dividend 
clientele effect because a significant portion of observed cross-sectional variation in 
individual portfolio dividend yields can be explained. However, Pettit (1977) notes that 
the identified relationship in no means suggests that the market price of a security is 
determined by the dividend policy followed by the firm. In fact, no one firm is able to 
benefit by a shift in its dividend policy. This is in line with Miller and Modigliani 
(1961) who suggested following: ”If, for example, the frequency distribution of 
corporate payout ratios happened to correspond exactly with the distribution of investor 
preferences for payout ratios, then the existence of these preferences would clearly lead 
ultimately to a situation whose implications were different in no fundamental respect 
from the perfect market case. Each corporation would tend to attract to itself a 
'clientele' consisting of those preferring its particular payout ratio, but one clientele 
would be entirely as good as another in terms of the valuation it would imply for the 
firm.”
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) studied the effect of personal taxes and dividends 
on capital asset prices. The model that they use is an extension of the single period 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) that was derived by Brennan (1973) under the 
assumptions of unlimited borrowing and lending at the risk free rate of interest and
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unrestricted short sales. Their model accounts for a progressive tax scheme and both 
wealth and income related constraints on borrowing. The latter constraint serves to limit 
the interest deductions individuals can utilise to the amount of dividend income their 
portfolios generate. Those individuals whom this constraint is binding would find 
increased dividends desirable in that such increases serve to effectively relax the 
constraint.
The equilibrium relationship indicates that the before tax expected return on a security is 
linearly related to its systematic risk and to its dividend yield. Moreover, the results 
imply that there is a strong positive relationship between before tax expected returns and 
dividend yields of common stocks which means that investors require additional before 
tax return and investors’ tax brackets do influence their portfolio choices. They also find 
evidence consistent with existence of a clientele effect.
A year later Litzerberger and Ramaswamy (1980) re-examined the effects of tax- 
induced investor clienteles on capital asset prices. They extended a model of asset prices 
in the presence of short selling restrictions together with simplified taxation scheme 
with individuals in diverse but constant marginal tax brackets. The implication of the 
model is that the differences in the tax brackets in the presence of short selling 
restrictions would induce dividend clienteles with he tendency of low tax bracket 
individuals to hold high yielding stocks as originally argued by Elton and Gruber 
(1970). In line with their earlier paper the results seem to support the existence of the 
tax clientele CAPM.
They also accounted the effect of non-paying stocks by fitting a dummy variable in the 
econometric model. This procedure was accomplished to see whether the required return 
on non-paying stocks is higher than would be predicted by the tax clientele CAPM. In a 
capital market where short selling is restricted, non-dividend paying stocks would have 
to pay a premium to attract investors to absorb the stock, which strengthens Litzerberger 
and Ramaswamy’s belief that taxes divide investors into clienteles.
Blume (1980) also investigated stock returns and dividend yields. He presents evidence 
which suggests that the relationship between returns realised on common stock and
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dividend yield is substantially more complicated than implied in prior work of Friend 
and Puckett (1964) or Black and Scholes (1974). Blume uses an alternative measure of 
dividend yield which is the ratio of dividends paid over the previous twelve months to 
the price at the beginning of these twelve months. He argues that the yield he uses has 
greater forecasting accuracy than the Black-Scholes measure if companies tended to 
adjust dividend levels quickly to maintain a fixed payout ratio and the price-earnings 
ratio is relatively sticky. Black and Scholes took as their yield measure the realised 
dividend yield of portfolios selected by ranking securities by the sum of dividends per 
share paid during the previous year divided by price per share at the end of the year.
Blume estimated the cross-sectional regressions with quarterly returns for time period 
from 1936 to 1976. The estimates reveal a positive and significant relationship between 
the quarterly realised rates of return and both the beta coefficients and the anticipated 
quarterly dividend yields. Blume was the first to suggest that there might be a non-linear 
relationship between dividend paying and non-dividend paying stocks. He also searched 
for possible explanations and concluded that ”Tax effect, at least by themselves, would 
seem unable to explain the finding that over the thirty years beginning in 1947 and end 
in 1976, the quarterly returns on non-paying stocks exceeded, on average, the returns on 
low-yielding stocks. A tax system in which dividends are taxed in aggregate at a greater 
rate than capital gains would imply that expected before-tax returns should increase 
smoothly with increases in dividend yields, not first decrease and then increase.” Rather 
he believed that market participants often underestimated over this period the 
subsequent growth of dividends for high-yielding stocks relative to low-yielding stocks.
A re-examination of whether shareholders with higher dividend yields receive higher 
risk-adjusted rates of return to compensate for the heavier taxes on dividend payments 
than long-term capital gains was presented by Miller and Scholes (1982). The message 
of their paper was that any yield-related effects associated with short-term measures 
must arise from sources other than the long-run tax differential. Therefore, they strongly 
critique the results obtained from studies using such measures.4
4 Studies which apply short-run (ex-dividend day) measures of dividend yield: Long 1978; Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy 1979,1980; Blume 1980; Hess 1982;
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Miller and Scholes (1982) used various short-run measures of dividend yield to test 
yield-related tax effects. The perfect-foresight definition of dividend yield returned 
estimated coefficients that were in the plausible range for a tax effect and appeared to be 
estimated with great precision. Next, they tested level-revised dividend yield variable 
which eliminated information bias by exploiting the declaration date of dividends. 
Compared to perfect-foresight the estimated tax effect coefficient dropped substantially 
but remained highly significant and still within the plausible range for a tax effect. After 
that they lagged firms’ dividend yields for 12 and 36 months. For the former no 
significant coefficient emerged whereas the latter received highly significant positive 
coefficient.
This made them to conclude that the relation between returns and dividend yields is 
sensitive to the definition of dividend yield. They argue that the differences in estimated 
yield effects appear to reflect differences in the degree to which the various short-run 
measures of expected dividend yield introduce unwanted information effects. Finally, 
they applied a method for correcting those measures for their information effects and 
found no significant remaining relation between returns and expected dividend yields or 
at least nothing that could be considered a yield-related tax effect. (Miller and Scholes, 
1982)
A study from Poterba and Summers (1984) suggests that taxes are important 
determinants of security market equilibrium and deepen the puzzle of why firms pay 
dividends. Their paper uses British data to examine the effects of dividend taxes on 
investors’ relative valuation of dividends and capital gains. British data as well as U.S. 
data offer great potential to study the relationship between dividends and stock price 
movements because there have been radical changes in terms of dividend tax policy 
during last four decades.5
Poterba and Summers (1984) used daily data on a small sample of firms and monthly 
data on a much broader sample to inspect if taxes affect the valuation of dividends. The 
small sample consisted of the share prices and dividends of 16 large UK firms. For each 
firm in the sample they included all ex-dates between 1955 and 1981 corresponding to
5 See Poterba and Summers (1984) study for evolution of the British tax system.
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cash dividend payments which were taxable as ordinary income and not accompanied by 
any dividend rights, stock options or other special features. Their broader data set 
contained monthly observations on prices, dividend payments and market indices for 
3.500 UK firms during the same time period.
Using both daily and monthly data on British securities Poterba and Summers (1984) 
document that changes in dividend taxation have a substantial effect on the premium 
which investors require to induce them to receive returns in the form of dividends. 
However, they point out that while daily share price movements are likely to yield the 
most precise evidence on dividend valuation, they may be contaminated by tax arbitrage 
or other unusual patterns around ex-days. But still the finding that dividend taxes are 
recognised by investors and affect the ex ante returns which they demand only deepens 
the puzzle of why firms pay dividends conclude Poterba and Summers.
In late 1980’s a dividend imputation tax credit scheme was introduced in Australia. This 
allowed Clarke (1992) to analyse the ex-dividend day behaviour of Australian share 
prices before and after the imputation. Clarke’s study extends a work of Brown and 
Walter (1986) who were sceptical of concluding that the evidence they found of 
dividends being discounted by the Australian equities market was solely tax driven. 
With the introduction of dividend imputation Clarke argues that if the pricing of 
Australian equities is dominated by the actions and preferences of Australian resident 
investors then an increase in the observed average drop-off ratio across equities would 
be expected as proposed by the tax clientele hypothesis.
Data for the period 1973-1984 were obtained form the data file used by Brown and 
Walter in their 1986 paper and the complimentary data for the period 1985-1988 
including ex-dividend dates, dividend amounts and percentage of franking were 
collected from number of publications provided by the Melbourne Stock Exchange and 
the Stock Exchange Research Pty. Ltd.
The results of the tests indicate that time period before tax imputation reflected a market 
wide preference for capital gains over dividends. After introducing the imputation 
system there have been changes in the average drop-off ratio. However, the results
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obtained suggest that the drop-off ratios decreased on average which was contrary to 
expected changes arising from the new tax regimes for dividends and capital gains. 
Clarke’s inference from this is that the results are in conflict with tax-induced clientele 
effect.
2.2.3 Taxes in Finland
In the U.S. shareholders’ returns are taxed twice. First, companies pay corporate taxes 
for their earnings and then earnings are further taxed in the hands of shareholders who 
pay either income or capital gains taxes. The applied system is called two tiers of tax 
and is relatively rare according to Brealy and Myers (1996, p. 435). Companies in 
Finland operate under very different tax system.
In Finland dividends are not taxed twice. All companies pay corporate taxes at equal 
rate of 28 %. If companies distribute any dividends the shareholders are taxed for 
divided income but they may deduct from this tax bill their share of the corporate tax 
that the company has paid. Because the dividend income is taxed at fixed rate of 28 %, 
the corporate taxes exactly offset the dividend income taxes. For example:
A company earns pre-tax profits of 10 euros per share. Then the 
company pays corporate tax at 28 %, the profit is 7,20 euros per 
share. The company now declares a net dividend of 7,20 euros and 
sends each shareholder a check for this amount. This dividend is 
accompanied by a tax credit saying that the company has already paid 
2,80 euros of tax on the shareholders behalf. Thus shareholders are 
treated as if each received a total, or gross, dividend of 7,20 euros +
2,80 euros and paid tax of 2,80 euros. If the shareholder’s tax rate is 
28% , like it is in Finland, there is no more tax to pay and the 
shareholder retains the net dividend of 7,20 euros.
Compared to US the capital gains are taxed similar way in Finland. Companies pay 
every year corporate tax on their profits. If the after tax profits are retained in the
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company, a shareholder can realise the return by selling off his stocks. The shareholder 
pays tax at rate of 28 % if the selling price is higher than the price when the stocks were 
acquired. In Finland as well as in US capital gains are taxed twice; first at corporate 
level and then at personal level when the stocks are actually sold. Due to the tax 
imputation system applied on dividends the Finnish tax system favours dividend 
payments. Considering this fact more Finnish companies should be seen distributing 
earnings in dividends if they take the tax position of their shareholders into account. 
However, as I have demonstrated not very convincing evidence of tax effect has been 
found from US markets despite shifts in tax policy. Thus, I would expect taxes to have 
moderate effect on Finnish corporate managers when deciding corporate dividend 
policy.
2.3 To pay dividends
Indeed, dividends are universally paid and, therefore, they must be somehow desirable. 
There are four popular theories that attempt to explain investors demand for dividends.
2.3.1 The Bird-in-the-Hand explanation
One argument in favour of existence of relationship between firm value and dividend 
payout is that dividends are less risky and, hence, more valuable to investors than 
retained earnings. Thus, firm should set a high dividend payout ratio and offer a high 
dividend yield to maximise stock price. In these ”bird-in-the-hand-models” investors 
prefer dividends because cash in hand is better than promise of future capital 
appreciation. These models also assume symmetric information between insiders and 
outsiders of the company as well the existence of perfect markets.
The first models were introduced by Gordon and Shapiro (1956), Gordon (1963) and 
Walter (1963). All these models contain two different rates of return to evaluate future 
income. One is an opportunity rate for investor and the other is for the firm. Higher 
opportunity rate for investor implies that a firm should pay all of its cash flow as
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dividends because investor is able to receive better return for his capital elsewhere. If 
the opportunity rates were reversed, would the firm adopt a zero percent dividend 
payout rate. Investor is indifferent when the opportunity rates are equal as far as the 
dividend policy is concerned.
Bird-in-the-hand models are critized for having a few logical problems. Frankfurter 
(1992) argues that the models are unable to explain different dividend policies that exist. 
He also continues that, if the opportunity rate for the investor is higher than for the firm 
why should investor just insist receiving all earnings in dividends rather he should sell 
all his stocks and invest money some where else where the better rate of return is 
earned. Third, either 100% or 0% payout, or indifference, does not well satisfy the 
definition of dividend policy. Finally, Bhattacharya (1979) also argued that the 
reasoning underlying the bird-in-the-hand explanation for dividend relevance is 
fallacious. The riskiness of the cash flows from firm’s investments is the factor which 
determines the risk of the firm. An increase in dividend payout today will be followed 
by an equivalent drop in the ex-dividend price of the stock. It will not increase the value 
of the firm by reducing the riskiness of future cash flows.
2.3.2 The clientele effect
The idea that on the market there could be several different investor classes, clienteles 
which prefer dividends differently was recognised by Modigliani and Miller (1961). 
Their argumentation was based on the assumption that market imperfections divide 
investors into clienteles who desire systematically dividends and ones who do not.
The natural clientele for high-payout stocks is found among a part of small investors 
who place a special value on the steady earnings that ”income stocks” provide. As John 
and Williams (1985) among others, describe the persons that are most often categorised 
to belong to this group of investors are orphans, widows or retired persons who seek a 
steady source of cash to live on. Moreover, trusts and non-profit organisations may 
prefer high payouts and high dividend yields because dividends can be used to finance 
consumption, where as capital gains are additions to principal which cannot be spent.
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The institutional constraint position is expressed in detail by Graham and Dodd (1951) 
and Gordon and Bradford (1979) and is supported by Long’s (1978) examination of the 
returns on the dual series common stock of one firm.
Contrary to high dividend paying stocks there is a clientele for so called growth, low 
dividend paying companies as well. Modigliani and Miller (1961) call these investors 
young accumulators who prefer companies that pay lower dividends, reinvest more of 
their earnings and provide a greater percentage of their total returns in the form of 
capital gains.
It is true that in some cases legal restrictions may prevent institutions from selling its 
shares but for the part of a sizeable number of investors such limitations do not apply. 
All these investors are able to manufacture home-made dividends by selling a small part 
of their securities and, therefore, individual is indifferent between cash dividend and 
selling a part of his portfolio. For example, consider that the company retains all its cash 
flows and pays zero dividend. The value of the company on the ex-dividend day is 
exactly the same as before. If some investors require more dividends they could time to 
time sell off a small fraction of their holdings to manufacture home-made dividends. In 
that case every investor is able receive as much dividends as they desire and the 
preference for certain type of dividend paying firm becomes irrational. There are several 
constraints like transaction costs and taxes which make it questionable if self-made 
dividends work in the real world.
Shefrin and Statman (1984) tried to explain dividend clientele effect with a framework 
based on self control theory. Self control theory suggests that an investor who wishes to 
secure long-run wealth against excess current consumption might employ a rule that 
prohibits spending from capital. Such an individual may be better off by allowing 
current consumption to be determined by the dividend payout from his stock portfolio. 
In self control framework dividends and sale of stock for income cannot be treated as 
perfect substitutes because allowing oneself the discretion of selling stock for current 
consumption may cause the portfolio to be consumed more quickly than is consistent 
with one’s long-term goals. The theory also suggest that the proportion of the portfolio
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devoted to dividend paying stock will increase when investor moves from the saving 
stage of the life cycle to the dissaving stage.
Shefrin and Statman (1984) advance another plausible reason why investors display 
distinct preference for cash dividends. They argue that consumption from dividends may 
be preferred to consumption from capital for people who are averse to regret. They 
continue that some stockholders are reluctant to sell shares (manufacture home-made 
dividends) because of the change of having to sell the shares at temporarily depressed 
prices. On the other hand, the firm faces eventually the same sort of problem if it has to 
visit the capital market to finance the dividends by issuing shares but a counter 
argument is that the firm can choose the most appropriate time to sell.
According to Shefrin and Statman (1984) self control theory and a wish to avoid regret 
can explain why investors divide into clienteles who prefer high yield stocks and ones 
who desire low dividend yield stocks. To test these hypothesis they use an empirical 
study of Lease, Lewellen and Schlarbaum (1976) which analyses the demographic 
characteristics and portfolio compositions of a wide variety of individual investors. As 
they assumed the percentage of portfolio in income securities rises as people get older. 
The two groups of young investors devote 27 % and 34 % of their portfolios to income 
stocks. For older working men , the proportion of the portfolio devoted to dividend 
income rises to 39 %. Finally, the retired groups invest 56 % and 57 % of their stock in 
income generating securities and, they also value the importance of steady dividend 
income very high. These findings are consistent with self-control theory which explains 
why people in the saving stage of life cycle hold portfolios with lower dividend yields 
than those held by people in the dissaving stage of the life cycle. The relatively high 
percentage of young investors investing in income securities is explained by the 
interaction of self-control theory and regret aversion according to Shefrin and Statman 
(1984).
The clientele effect is a possible explanation for management reluctance to alter 
established payout ratios because such changes in dividend policy might cause current 
marginal shareholder to switch companies, which would involve brokerage costs, and, 
possibly, capital gains taxes (Soter, Brigham and Evanson, 1996).
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2.3.3 The agency cost theory
The agency cost theory is another popular view of dividend relevance, which was 
advanced by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and further extended by Rozeff (1982) and 
Easterbrook (1984). Agency theory assumes that the market is dominated by 
informational asymmetry between the share holders and managers of the firms. Most of 
the finance literature about dividends presumes that managers are perfect agents of 
shareholders and their main principle is to maximise shareholder’s wealth, however, in a 
case of agency theory a contrary opinion is taken. The managers are not perfect agents 
instead they have conflicting interests with outside shareholders and they have 
propensity to pursue their own interests as often as possible argues Easterbrook (1984) 
among others.
The conflicting interests arise if the managers are not the residual claimants to the firm’s 
income stream. For instance, assume that owner-managers sell off part of their 
ownership in a company. The outside shareholders will charge, ex ante, for the 
possibility that the management misuses the earnings (make short-run operating 
decisions, consume excessive perquisites or cause the firm to grow beyond the optimal 
size) by increasing their personal wealth at the expense of new equity owners. To 
decrease the ex ante charge, it is in the best interests of shareholders and managers to 
build mechanisms that give managers incentive to act as better agents if such costs are 
less than the ex ante charge that outsiders would be forced to request. Such devices 
include monitoring, bonding and ex post readjustment mechanisms. Costs which are 
borne by applying these methods are agency costs. (Copeland and Weston, 1988 p. 567)
Easterbrook (1984) classifies agency costs as monitoring costs and opportunity costs. He 
argues that monitoring of management is costly for individual shareholder who is only 
able to recapture a portion of the potential reduction in agency costs. This is likely to 
lead an underinvestment in monitoring. Easterbrook concludes that shareholders would 
be better off if monitoring were completed by exogenous institutions.
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The second source of agency costs is risk aversion on the part of managers. The 
stockholders who hold well diversified portfolios of stocks are not concerned about any 
firm specific risks. However, managers often have a considerable part of their personal 
prosperity tied up in their company. If the company fails to meet all obligations and goes 
bankrupt, the managers not only lose their jobs but all wealth invested in the firm’s 
stocks as well. Thus, managers have an incentive to minimise bankruptcy possibility by 
choosing projects that are safe but create lower income streams than riskier investments, 
in other words, investing suboptimally.
Investing suboptimally is not the only tool for managers to lower the total risk of the 
firm. To change debt to equity ratio is an alternative method. Decreasing the amount of 
debt management is able to decrease the liabilities to creditors which lowers the 
possibility of bankruptcy. Lower risk is awarded by debtholders’ lower demands on the 
rate of return. The decreased total risk enrich creditors at the expense of shareholders 
and, therefore, shareholders would like to induce managers to take more risks.
2.3.3.1 Methods of reducing agency costs
There exists several different ways to accomplish agency cost reduction. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) find it efficient to increase managers ownership stake in the firm. 
Increasing their ownership to a extreme case where managers own 100% of the stocks 
can equity agency costs be reduced to zero. A notion should be mentioned here that the 
higher the level of the manager ownership the less diversified their wealth becomes and 
the possibility of underinvestment becomes greater. Thus, using increased managerial 
stock ownership to control agency costs is not costless. As managers’ wealth becomes 
more poorly diversified, they will require increasing amounts of compensation.
Another way, and the one which is the most relevant in this study, is to pay out more 
dividends in order to reduce agency costs. Higher dividends reduce the resources under 
management’s control and thereby decrease their power to waste cash on organisation 
inefficiencies Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984). Jensen (1986) finds the conflicts of 
interests between shareholders and managers over payout policies to be severe when
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organisation creates substantial free cash flow. Free cash flow is a cash flow in excess of 
that required to fund all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at 
the relevant cost of capital.
Paying larger dividends reduces internal cash flow subject to management discretion. 
Both monitoring problem and the risk-aversion problem become less significant if the 
firm consistently has to raise external equity from the capital market. When the firm 
issues new shares the managers will be under greater scrutiny by investment bankers, 
suppliers of new capital and law enforcers. The greatest advantage of keeping firms 
constantly in the market for capital is that the providers of capital are very good 
monitors of managers which decreases the monitoring costs for old equity owners and 
ensures that managers act in the best interest of outside shareholders. (Easterbrook, 
1984)
High dividends represent only one way to distribute excess cash flows to owners. Other 
possible solutions are special dividends or open market share repurchase programs and 
even in some more extreme cases of excess capital, large tender offers for firm’s own 
stock financed with new borrowings Soter, Brigham and Evanson (1996).
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest a third way to diminish equity agency costs which 
is to use more debt financing. When the firm issues more debt, including bonds, 
commercial papers, and syndicated bank loans the total equity financing reduces. This 
leads to a situation where manager-stockholder conflicts have become less important 
reducing the need for monitoring. However, as Jensen and Meckling point out 
bondholders are concerned that stockholders may seek to expropriate their wealth by 
increasing their risk through risky corporate investment decisions which gives rise to 
debt agency costs.
Both equity and debt agency costs lower the value of the firm. To minimise these cost 
the managers can choose a least costly financial policy mix. This creates a balance 
between the interest of debtholder and shareholders. The firm which needs more money 
from capital markets can adjust its the debt to equity ratio at the same time so that 
neither shareholders nor debtholders are able to take advantage of the other group.
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2.3.3.2 Testing of agency theory
Easterbrook (1984) was aware of the fact that designing an empirical test for agency- 
cost explanation is challenging because of the variables that enter the theoretical model 
are not directly measurable. Problems arise claims Frankfurter (1992) when these 
variables are replaced with proxy variables which do not properly measure the 
theoretical ones. Frankfurter also criticise agency theory for containing a set of 
assumptions which are more or less unrealistic. For example:
• Individuals are assumed to act exclusively in their own self-interest, but may enter 
contracts to modify the agent’s behaviour. With the exception of the manager’s 
compensation contract, these contracts are not explicit.
• A manager obtains utility solely from income and disutily from effort, and these two 
elements are fully separable. Thus, disutily of effort does not change with income.
• The manager is risk averse, but stockholders are risk takers
• Monitoring systems exist and are informative, not noisy, providing shareholders 
information about management’s effort.
• Even in repeated agency relationships, the periods are independent. Thus, learning is 
tempered, or would be non-existent.
Despite the arguments that cast a shadow above the agency theory, Easterbrook (1984) 
continues arguing that dividend increases are not unambiguous signals of future 
earnings. Investors may interpret higher payout ratio either as a signal that the company 
is able meet higher dividend obligations due to increased expected cash flows or a lack 
of investment opportunities forces the company to distribute excess cash flows to 
shareholders. It is this unambiguousness which enables the tests on agency theory.
According to Easterbrook the presence of new fund raising would indicate that 
dividends did not represent disinvestment. It also would isolate the set of firms whose 
managers were not able to rely wholly on internally generated funds and for which, 
therefore, dividends might reduce agency costs. Lower agency costs would then attract
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investors to bid up the price of the stock for those firms which simultaneously pay 
dividends and raise new money. It is not the dividends per se which is important rather 
it is the increased frequency of trips to capital markets caused by dividends.
In their study of shareholders reaction to dividend cuts and omissions Ghosh and 
Woolridge (1988) analysed to existence of agency theory. The agency theory predicts a 
stock price decline on announcement of a dividend cut or omission because a reduction 
in dividend payout generates internal funds for investment purposes, thereby reducing 
trips to the capital market and consequently increasing agency costs. Their final sample 
consisted of 930 dividend cuts and omissions between 1962 and 1984. A standard 
event-study technique was employed to measure the valuation effects of announcements 
of dividend cuts or omissions. The results confirm that firms reducing their dividends 
suffer large losses in value around the announcement day which is consistent with the 
implication of agency theory. However, the results also imply existence of signalling 
theory (will be handled more thoroughly later) and, in fact, data indicate that 
announcement effects of dividend cuts or omissions are greatly influenced by the 
negatively perceived dividend signals. Even managerial announcements that funds 
generated from lower cash distributions are intended to support profitable investment 
opportunities only produce a weakly offsetting effect. (Ghosh and Woolridge, 1988)
In 1989 Crutchley and Hansen presented findings of an empirical test of agency theory. 
Their study examines corporate leverage and dividend policies as well as managers’ 
common stock ownership behaviour. The data consists of 603 industrial firms and the 
sample period is 1981-1985. As discussed earlier agency theory suggests that managers 
choose the policy mix of manager stock ownership, outside leverage, and dividends to 
minimise agency costs. Crutchley and Hansen (1989) found evidence that firms with 
greater earnings volatility leads to lower leverage. Also found, however, is that greater 
earnings volatility is associated with greater managerial ownership and with larger 
dividends. The study also finds that larger firms not only use more leverage, but they 
also pay out larger dividends and their managers have lower equity ownership. In 
addition, it is found that lower diversification cost not only induces greater equity 
ownership by managers but also induces lower dividends and lower debt ratios. These 
findings provide evidence supporting the agency theory and are in line with the
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proposition that managers make financial policy trade-offs to control agency costs in an 
efficient manner according to Crutchley and Hansen (1989).
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) tested the potential agency problems regarding substantial 
free cash flows. They attempted to distinguish a group of firms which overinvest by 
accepting marginal investment projects with negative net present values. The study 
divides firms into overinvestors and a mixed group of value maximizers and marginal 
overinvestors on the basis of Tobin’s q ratio.6 Lang and Litzenberger (1989) argued that 
a firm is overinvesting if the average Tobin’s q ratio is less than unity. It is assumed 
that a firm’s investments are scale expanding and exhibit decreasing marginal efficiency 
of capital. They also continue that announcements of dividend changes by overinvesting 
firms will change investors’ expectations about the size of the firms’ future investment 
in negative NPV projects. An increase in the dividend will, all else being equal, lessen 
the overinvestment and increase the market value of the firm according to Lang and 
Lizenberger (1989). This is what they call overinvestment hypothesis.
The results show that the average return is significantly larger for firms with inferior 
investment opportunities than for firms with superior investment opportunities, where 
investment opportunities are measured by Tobin’s q. This is consistent with the 
overinvestment hypothesis and thus, is in line with agency theory. Dividend increases 
for overinvesting firms signal information that in future less negative NPV projects will 
be undertaken.
The Easterbrook hypothesis that growing firms simultaneously raising capital and 
increasing their dividend rate rise more in value than firms that simply increase their 
dividend rate was tested by Bom and Rimbey (1993). In their paper they examine the 
relation between prior financing activity and the market response to initial dividends to 
determine the validity of Easterbrook model. Bom and Rimbey emphasise that prior 
financing helps to distinguish firms with opportunities from those that are divesting, 
because raising capital requires third parties to invest financial and reputational capital 
in the issuer’s securities which increases the frequency of outside audits and puts the 
firm under greater surveillance. Bom and Rimbey (1993) extend the Easterbrook model
6 see the definition of Tobin’s q ratio p.12.
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by assuming a positive relation between the amount of prior financing and the 
shareholder response to subsequent dividend policy changes. Assuming external 
financing signals growth firms, a greater amount of financing should provide stronger 
certification. Holding the relative amount of the subsequent dividend surprise constant, 
they expect a stronger market response to dividend policy announcements by firms with 
the strongest prior growth certification, yielding a positive relation between prior 
financing and the shareholders response to the dividend announcement.
The results were obtained inspecting 490 firms during the time period from 1962 
through 1989. The sample consisted of 16 firms which had resumed a cash payment 
policy and 474 firms which had initiated cash dividends. For each of these firms the date 
of the public announcement of the dividend event and the amount, type, and date of any 
pre-dividend financing activities were identified. Bom and Rimbey (1993) found that 
the announcement is generally associated with positive abnormal returns. This holds for 
firms that engage in financing, suggesting the dividend is not redundant information. 
The abnormal returns are positively related to the extent of the dividend surprise. The 
evidence consistent with Easterbrook’s agency cost model that strong prior certification 
of growth leads to a stronger initial dividend response is supported by a perception that 
as the amount of pre-declaration financing rises, the subsequent shareholder wealth 
response to the dividend announcement rises. (Bom and Rimbey, 1993)
2.3.4 Financial signalling
At present, dividend signalling is well known among the academics. These signalling 
models as well as agency theory assume that there is informational asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders or, in other words, managers have a superior knowledge about the 
firm’s future prospects compared to the outside shareholders. Managers may then use 
various signalling devices to convey this information to the public. Two of the most 
important signalling devices available are earnings and divided figures.
How do dividends and asymmetric information fit together? It was in their 1961 article 
where Miller and Modigliani recognised that in the real world a change in the market
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price often follows a change in the dividend rate. On the basis of that fact, they reasoned 
that dividends changes might contain information about future fortunes of the firm 
which enables market participants to predict future earnings more accurately. They also 
continue that when a firm follows a policy of dividend stabilisation, investors will have 
a good reason to interpret that announcing a change in the dividend payout rate 
indicates a change in management’s views of the firm’s future profitability.
The first empirical tests were directed to test whether dividends have the potential to 
convey information about the future earnings of the firm. Watts (1973) hypothezed this 
problem that knowledge of current and past dividends enables a better prediction of 
future earnings than is possible with current and past earnings alone. In other words, if 
dividends convey information in addition to the information conveyed by earnings, the 
additional information must be reflected in the difference between actual current 
dividends and the expectation of current dividends conditional on current earnings.
Watts estimated this difference (unexpected change in dividends) for 310 firms during 
the period 1946 to 1967 and conducted two tests. In the first test, he regressed future 
earnings on unexpected changes in dividends and found average coefficients to be 
positive with low t -statistics which implies positive but weak relationship. The second 
test was performed to show if there is a relationship between the sign of the unexpected 
change in the current dividend and the sign of detrended future earnings changes. The 
sign test also implies the positive relationship between current dividends changes and 
changes in future earnings. Both tests indicated positive but weak relationship and, 
therefore, Watts concluded that, in general, if there is any information in dividends, it is 
very small. Not even monopolistic access to that information would enable one to make 
above-normal returns after transaction costs so the information in dividends must be 
trivial.
Watts was aware of the fact that his study was subject to two biases. First, the use of 
monthly, rather than daily, stock price data makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
effect of dividend and other contemporaneous information releases. Second, the 
potential noise in the dividend expectation model reduces the power of the tests.
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Studying two potential corporate signals: dividend changes and ”extraordinary” 
components of accounting income numbers, Gonedes (1978) reported similar results. In 
his study Gonedes takes conventional perspective which assumes that investors behave 
as if income numbers reflect information about the unobservable characteristics of 
firms’ decisions. The evidence he shows is inconsistent with the view that dividends or 
extraordinary-item signals reflect information beyond that reflected in contemporaneous 
income signals or other existing sample evidence.
Bhattacharya (1979) develops a model that can be used to explain why firms may pay 
dividends despite the tax disadvantage of doing so. The framework is based on the idea 
that dividends are taxed at the ordinary income tax rate, whereas capital gains are taxed 
at a lower rate. The tax rate difference incurs signalling costs which can be traded off 
against valuable information associated with dividends decreasing information 
asymmetry. If investors believe that firms that pay greater dividends per share have 
higher values, then an unexpected dividend increase will be taken as a favourable signal 
of expected cash flows.
The other sources of information such as annual reports, accountants’ reports or 
earnings forecasts are ignored because they are fundamentally unreliable and can not 
communicate the profitability information without involving moral hazard according to 
Bhattacharya (1979). Because the dividends are exogenously costly for firms requiring 
cash, it is expensive for less successful firms (they would have to raise external funds) 
to mimic the credible signal. For example, a firm that simultaneously pays cash 
dividends and borrows may be giving a different signal than if it had made the same 
dividend payment without borrowing. Hence the signalling value of dividends is 
positive and can be traded off against the tax loss associated with dividend income.
First empirical studies which employ daily return data instead of monthly stock returns 
were Charest (1978) and Aharony and Swary (1980). The latter trying to isolate the 
information reflected in both earnings and dividends and then consider the remainder of 
the information conveyed by dividend announcements. Charest reported that the 
announcement of a dividend increase generates an excess return of about 1%, but he 
made no attempt to remove the effect of contemporaneous earnings announcements.
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Thus, he concludes that his evidence does not necessarily reveal the presence of 
information in dividend announcements.
For controlling contemporaneous information Aharony and Swary (1980) examine only 
quarterly dividend and earnings announcements conveyed to the public on different 
dates within any given quarter. The announcement dates had to be separated by at least 
eleven trading days. Documented results indicate significant average excess return of 
about 1% over the two-day announcement period for companies increasing their 
dividends. The companies that reduced their dividends sustained, on average, negative 
abnormal returns and in absolute terms the decreases were much greater than for those 
increasing dividends.
Combining all evidence Aharony and Swary summed up that announcements of 
quarterly dividend changes provide information beyond that already provided by 
corresponding quarterly earnings numbers contribute support for the information content 
of the dividend hypothesis. When dividend increases are announced before or after 
earnings increases, stockholders realise abnormal returns in the day surrounding both 
dividend and earnings announcement dates which implies that dividend and earnings 
announcements are not perfect substitutes. In addition, their study also supports the 
semi-strong form of the efficient capital market hypothesis. There is no leakage of 
information conveyed by earnings numbers prior to the dividend announcement, and the 
full impact of the announcement is concentrated in the two-day announcement period.
The stock price reaction to dividend announcements is re-examined by Asquith and 
Mullins (1983). Their analysis as well as Aharony and Swary’s uses daily data to allow 
explicit identification and control of other simultaneous information. A naive dividend 
expectation model which assumes that any change in dividends is unexpected, was 
applied to a sample of 168 firms that paid no dividends either during their entire 
corporate histories or for at least ten years. Asquith and Mullins (1983) argue that 
dividends should be most visible at initiation and if the dividend initiation is 
unexpected, the market reaction on the announcement day should capture the full effect.
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They continue to argue that the present value of various hypothesised effects7 may 
already be incorporated in stock prices when subsequent dividends are announced. If the 
dividends are partially forecast, the effect of subsequent dividend announcements should 
reflect only the communication of incremental information plus any unexpected changes 
in the hypothesised effects. Thus, investigating initial, unanticipated dividends should 
give a clearer view of the true impact of dividends on shareholder’s wealth. (Asquith 
and Mullins, 1983)
Asquith and Mullins’ results show that during the two-day announcement period 
shareholders earn an excess return of 3,7 % which is associated with significant t- 
statistic. Moreover, for almost 70 % of the firms that were examined there is a positive 
market reaction to the announcement of initial dividend. In accordance with Asquith and 
Mullís the most striking fact is that the result support the hypothesis that any negative 
wealth effect dividends generate (either through changes in tax-induced clienteles or 
through increased future financing costs for the firm) is, on the average, more than 
offset by the positive value investors place on being paid a dividend.
Asquith and Mullins also tested the possibility that the results obtained might be the 
result of information other than the announcement of an initial dividend. They identified 
all other events that occurred within +/- 10 days of any dividend announcements. After 
that they performed the same test as earlier and found that an initial dividend 
announcement results positive excess returns even when there is no other information 
released simultaneously which, in turn, suggests that the market’s positive reaction to 
the dividend announcement is not due to other events.
Next they examined the market’s reaction to subsequent dividend announcements which 
showed that subsequent increases are small compared to the initial increase. They found 
potential difficulties why inferring that initiating a dividend policy has a positive present 
value over and above that observed with subsequent dividend increases is somewhat 
problematic. First, there is no control for the size of the dividend. Presumably if
7 Factors that have positive wealth effect: establishing a mechanism for communicating managerial information, 
reducing institutional constraints on investors and benefits associated with the view that investors prefer returns in 
the form of cash dividends.
Factors that have negative wealth effect: the additional tax burden, the adjustment cost incurred by changes in 
clienteles and any other costs (for example administrative costs, transaction costs associated with issuing new equity) 
incurred paying dividends. (Asquith and Mullins, 1983)
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dividends are a signalling device, the size of the dividend is a measure of the magnitude 
of the signal. Initial dividends may be larger than subsequent increases and this may 
explain the larger excess returns. Second, the naive expectations model may be a more 
accurate reflection of investors’ expectations at the time of dividend initiation. Once a 
dividend policy is in place, the past sequence and timing of dividend changes may 
provide information that allows investors to construct a better forecasting model. If 
dividend increases are expected and received as good news, the naive expectation model 
for subsequent increases measure only the average reaction to the unexpected portion of 
the increase, which is less than the full effect of a partially forecast dividend increase. 
(Asquith and Mullins 1983)
The paper of Miller and Rock (1985) deals with the effects of optimal 
investment/financing/dividend decisions under asymmetric information. In their analysis 
Miller and Rock show that the cost of signalling is caused by the fact that the familiar 
Fisherian criterion for optimal investment becomes time inconsistent. That is the firm 
no longer invests in real assets until the marginal internal rate of return equals the 
appropriately risk-adjusted rate of return on securities. According to Miller and Rock if 
the market really were to believe that the firm’s decisions conformed to the classical 
criterion, those stockholders planning to sell shares after the dividend announcement 
could bribe the firm’s decision maker to cut back investment and pay the funds out as a 
dividend. Those not planning to sell might offer a counter-bribe to keep the decision 
maker impartial. They continue to show that potential bribing power of sellers induces 
the departure from the full-information optimum. The informationally consistent 
signalling equilibrium exists under asymmetric information and the trading of shares 
restores the time consistency of investment policy, but the price for restoring that 
consistency appears to be underinvestment, relative to the optimum achievable full 
information and/or no trading according to Miller and Rock (1985).
A study of Kose and Williams (1985) identifies a signalling equilibrium with taxable 
dividends under information asymmetry. Their key argument why firms pay dividends 
with their primarily adverse personal taxes while less costly technologies for releasing 
inside information exist, is that dividends are serve as a positive signal which is properly 
understood by the investment public. In this equilibrium, corporate insiders with more
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valuable private information optimally distribute larger dividends and receive higher 
prices for their stock whenever the demand for cash by both their firm and its current 
stockholders exceeds its internal supply of cash. For the firms with more valuable inside 
information the premium paid in the market for stocks with marginally larger dividends, 
and thereby the reduction in dilution for current shareholders, just compensates 
stockholders for the incremental personal taxes on dividends. Thus, many firms 
distribute dissipative dividends, rather than repurchasing shares, while others distribute 
dividends and simultaneously sell new shares.
Furthermore, Kose and Williams (1985) reasoned that corporate insiders recognise the 
relationship between repeated dividends and their firm’s reputation and optimally 
smooth dividends over time relative to corporate cash inflows. That would explain why 
insiders might optimally pay a current dividend even if neither the firm nor its 
stockholders currently demand cash.
Ofer and Siegel (1987) document a relationship between announcements of unexpected 
changes in financial policy and unexpected changes in firm performance. They use a 
new methodology that combines analysis of stock price movements and earnings 
forecast data. The applied method allowed them to gain insight into the characteristics 
of the information that is being released by changes in a particular financial policy 
variable. The particular methodology in accordance with Ofer and Siegel (1987) has 
several advantages over previous studies that attempt to establish a direct link between 
changes in corporate financial policy and subsequent performance of the firm. First, the 
financial analysts’ forecasts of earnings have been shown to be a better proxy for market 
expectations than time-series models. Second, the effect of unexpected dividend 
changes on expectations of market participants are able to be examined directly. Finally, 
while other studies use ad hoc models of expected dividends in order to construct 
unexpected dividends, Ofer and Siegel use instrumental-variables techniques to 
eliminate the expected component of dividend changes.
By combining price-reaction data with expectations data Ofer and Siegel (1987) provide 
evidence that analysts revise their forecasts following the announcement of an 
unexpected dividend change by an amount positively related to the size of the
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unexpected dividend change. Also, they found support that the change in the dividend 
policy contains information about the expected level of cash flows and the change in the 
stock price around the announcement will reflect the market value of this information 
which is consistent with the evidence from other dividend-signalling models.
Further literature on the valuation impact of unanticipated dividend changes is presented 
by Ghosh and Woolridge (1988). Their study explores some implications and extensions 
of information content hypothesis. First, a test of the relationship between the valuation 
effect of a dividend change and selected firm-specific variables8 is performed by a 
multiple regression model which identifies the factors that contribute significantly to the 
capital loss suffered by shareholders when firms decide to cut or omit dividends. In 
addition, the interaction of simultaneous changes in dividends, earnings, and other 
variables that have potential valuation effect is investigated.
The conclusions were drawn based on 930 dividend cuts and omissions. The findings 
indicate that the significant influence of relevant firm-specific variables on the two-day 
event-period excess returns induced by dividend reductions supports the hypothesis that 
the stock price adjustment to dividend changes occurs in response to the information 
content of these decisions. Results indicate that the valuation effect induced by dividend 
cuts and omissions is greater for smaller firms and firms with lower variance of returns. 
A smaller effect is discovered for firms that suffer poor price performance and release 
unfavourable news items during the period preceding the dividend cut.
The results, after controlling for contemporaneous announcements of growth prospects 
and stock dividends, show that even managerial announcements that funds generated 
from lower cash distributions are intended to support profitable investment 
opportunities produce a weakly offsetting effect for shareholders wealth. A 
simultaneous payment of stock dividends was reported to have a positive and stronger 
effect on the capital loss induced by dividend cuts. This finding concluded by Ghosh 
and Woolridge (1988) is consistent with the notion that the value of a signal is a
8 Firm-specific explanatory variables include: (1) percentage change in dividends, (2) cumulative stock 
returns, (3) firm size, (4) risk as measured by equity beta and (5) residual variance of the security from the 
market model.
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function of costs associated with it since stock dividends are costlier than press 
announcements of profitable investment opportunities.
Evidence on the relation between dividend policy changes and subsequent earnings is 
provided by Healy and Palepu (1988). They examined whether there are significant 
changes in firms’ earnings performance surrounding either a dividend initiation or 
omission and, if so, whether these changes are consistent with the market reaction to the 
dividend policy changes. Their analysis differs from Watts’ paper in two ways. First, 
dividend announcement returns are used as a measure of dividend information rather 
than unexpected dividends and second, their sample consists of extreme dividend 
changes, initiations and omissions. The latter has been critizied for not being relevant to 
all dividend policy changes.
Healy and Palepu (1988) studied 131 firms that pay for the first time or start to pay 
dividends after a hiatus of at least ten years and 172 firms that omit dividend payments 
for the first time in their history or after paying continuously for at least ten years. All 
the dividend changes tested took place between 1969 and 1980. The results from 
statistical tests indicate that firms initiating dividends experience earnings growth 
starting at least a year before the dividend announcement. The earnings growth 
continues in the year of the dividend announcement and for two subsequent years. The 
comparable test for omitting firms show that dividend omissions follow significant 
earnings declines up to two years before. However, these declines do not persist beyond 
the announcement year. This is consistent with the proposition that these dividend 
decisions are preceded by systematic earnings patterns.
Tests of earnings performance after dividend policy changes show that firms that initiate 
or omit dividends have significant increases and decreases, respectively, in earnings for 
at least one year afterward. The earnings changes are positively related to the two-day 
abnormal stock price reaction at the dividend initiation or omission announcement. They 
obtained these results after controlling for the earnings changes in prior years, and 
information on future earnings available before the dividend announcement. The 
conclusions are consistent with the hypothesis that dividend initiations or omissions 
convey information on future earnings performance.
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Finally, they analysed the market reaction to earnings announcements after the dividend 
policy change to assess whether the market anticipates these earnings from the dividend 
announcement. They found that the magnitude of the stock price reactions to earnings 
announcements following the dividend initiation or omission is significantly less than 
usual, indicating that the market anticipates these earnings changes at the date of the 
dividend announcement. These findings provide further confirmation for information 
hypothesis and are consistent with the proposition that managers consider past and 
present performance as well as future earnings when changing corporate dividend 
policy.
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) investigated whether changes in dividends signal 
the future or the past. Unlike earlier studies, Watts (1973) who relied on a limited 
number of firm years and Healy and Palepu (1988) who also rely on a small number of 
data points and only consider the extreme cases of initiations and omissions, Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler employ a large number of firms and events. They examined 255 
dividend decreases and 4249 dividend increases.
The proceeds of the study reveal that there is a very strong lagged and contemporaneous 
correlation between dividend changes and earnings,9 but not much evidence of a 
positive relationship between dividend changes and future earnings changes is found 
which indicates that the predictive value of changes in dividends seems minimal. In the 
two years following dividend increases they found that earnings changes are unrelated to 
the sign and magnitude of the dividend change. The only strong predictive power they 
found is that dividend cuts reliably signal an increase in future earnings. Thus, they 
concluded changes in dividends signal permanence of the current increase in earnings 
and are consistent with Lintner’s view which suggests that firms increase dividends only 
when management believes that earnings have increased permanently.
The most recent study which explores competing theories regarding the information 
content of dividends is presented by Kaestner and Liu (1998). Unlike other previous 
studies this study simultaneously test three different hypotheses: (1) the single-signal
9 If a firm increases dividends, earnings have already gone up.
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cash-flow signalling hypothesis; (2) the free-cash flow hypothesis and, (3) multiple- 
signal cash-flow signalling hypothesis. The empirical testing is completed with two 
types of dividend announcements: dividend initiations (DI) and specially designated 
dividends (SDD). Kaestner and Liu (1998) argue that the use of two types of dividend 
announcements allows them to draw richer set of inferences from their results since the 
circumstances that motivate the payment of these dividends are different. They 
emphasise the distinct circumstances as follows: ”...with regard to the free cash flow 
hypothesis, an initiation of a ‘regular’ dividend represents a strong commitment by 
management to pay dividends and is an indication of the managerial decision to 
distribute free cash, leading to a reduction of agency problems. An unexpected 
specially-designated dividend, however, is less likely to be perceived as a commitment 
to distribute free cash in the future, although specially-designated dividends are in some 
cases a prelude to the initiation of a regular dividend. Thus, the relevance of the free- 
cash flow hypothesis is expected to be greater for the DI sample than the SDD sample. ”
They also highlight that all firms in the DI sample are initially paying a zero dividend, 
and to the extent that there are investor clienteles for dividends, all firms in DI sample 
would be expected to have similar clienteles. Therefore, empirical tests of the free-cash 
flow and cash-flow signalling models that use a sample of firms paying an initial 
dividend, should be relatively free of the confounding influences of dividend clientele 
effects according to Kaestner and Liu (1998).
To test multiple-signal cash-flow hypothesis more appropriately Kaestner and Liu 
introduce a new statistical methodology to analyse the pattern of insider trading. In these 
multi-signal models the change in the firm’s dividend policy cannot be evaluated 
independently of other management’s actions (insider trading) or firm characteristics. 
The information content is firm specific and the same type of dividend announcement 
may be viewed as good or bad news by market depending on the firm’s characteristics. 
In the case of dividend increases the model predicts that insider buying prior to the 
announcement will be viewed as good news by the market, and insider selling as bad 
news.
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The investment opportunities available to the firm according to Kaestner and Liu are as 
well critical firm characteristics that determines the direction of the stock price reaction 
to an announcement of a change in dividends. For the firms that have initiated dividend 
payments the stock price response should be positive for the firms with inferior 
investment opportunities, and negative for the firms with superior investment 
opportunities. Thus, in the case of a dividend initiation, insiders in firms with inferior 
investment opportunities would be expected to be net buyers of shares, while insiders in 
firms with superior investment opportunities would be expected to be net sellers of 
shares.
The empirical evidence obtained is consistent with previous studies and provide strong 
support for cash-flow signalling hypothesis. The size of the dividend payment had a 
positive and significant effect on the stock price. This was true for both dividend 
initiations and specially-designated dividend payments. However, the relationship 
between the size of the dividend change and the stock price response tend to be stronger 
in the DI sample than in the SDD sample. This result suggests that the market views 
dividend payments as a significant source of information about the future prospects of 
the firm.
In further tests they found additional support for the cash-flow signalling hypothesis, but 
only weak support for multiple-signal model. They predicted a negative stock price 
response for firms with very high values of Tobin’s q, but they were not able to find 
any significant findings. Although Tobin’s q sometimes had a negative and significant 
effect on the stock price response, the abnormal return remained positive even for firms 
with very large values of Tobin’s q. After adding insider trading into the model 
consistent abnormal buying among insiders of low q firms, and abnormal selling among 
insiders of high q firms could not be found prior to the dividend announcement.
The presence of the FCF hypothesis was tested with the help of Tobin’s q as well. They 
found that the investment opportunities of the firm were significantly related to the 
stock price response. According to Kaestner and Liu (1998) market views a dividend 
announcement by firms with relatively poor investment opportunities more favourably 
as compared to firms with relatively good investment opportunities. Moreover, they
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found that the announcement of a regular dividend such as a dividend initiation (DI) is 
viewed by the market as a more credible action to distribute free cash which was 
expected due to the different nature of these two types of dividend payments. They 
interpreted this finding that management in firms with inferior investment opportunities 
are signalling to the market that they will distribute free cash instead of investing in 
projects with a negative NPV which is consistent with agency theory.
2.4 Behavioural Models
The theory of dividends have inspired many researcher to develop and test many 
theoretical and mathematical models but not as much time and effort have been directed 
towards models explaining dividend behaviour. One of the earliest and oft referred 
studies of corporate dividend policy is Lintner’s (1956) classic partial adjustment study.
Lintner based his study on 28 carefully selected listed companies. The selection of the 
company was determined by fifteen observable factors and characteristics that appeared 
to reflect or might be expected to have an important bearing on dividend payments and 
policy. All 28 companies were titled to belong to industrial sector, because the 
companies in this sector had greater diversity of dividend policy and the relatively 
greater knowledge of dividend policies among other important groups. The companies 
were purposely chosen to represent variety of situations and to build in opportunities for 
significant suggestive contrasts between the policies of companies similar in several 
respect but differing in other important characteristics.(Lintner, 1956)
Interviews among the firms were completed in order to identify the factors which 
entered most actively into decisions when the dividend rates were changed, as well as in 
all cases when a change in dividends might have been under intense consideration even 
though no change was made. On the basis of the interviews, Lintner observed that all 
firms agreed that the existing dividend rate played a central role in the decision-making 
process. The existing rate was regarded as a critical factor both chancing the rate and 
how large the change in dividend payments should be. Major changes in earnings or
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levels of earnings “out of line” with existing dividend rates were the most important 
determinants of the company’s dividend decision according to Lintner’s study.
The results also suggested that managers believed investors to prefer a reasonably stable 
or moderately growing dividends. Thus, managers sought to avoid making changes in 
their dividend rates that might have to be reversed within a year or so. To minimise this 
possibility a common practice was to change the payout ratio towards a long term target 
payout ratio less than current earnings figures implied.
The periodic partial adjustment toward a target payout ratio can be characterised that a 
company has set a certain percentage that the company aims to pay to shareholders from 
its net earnings in the long run. It is an ideal situation towards which the company 
should move, but no means obligatory requirement. If there are changes in the current 
earnings, the company does not necessarily need to pay out the earnings in a proportion 
of this ratio instead it may choose to adjust the dividends only some part. For example, 
consider following:
There are two similar companies which have been paying 3 
euros per share on reasonably stable earnings on 5 euros per 
share. Suppose that earnings increase to a level of 10 euros, 
then the full adjustment of dividends for both companies would 
be indicated by dividend increase to a level of 6 euros per 
share. Instead of adjusting perfectly to earnings changes the 
company may choose a lower rate of adjustment. In that case 
the dividend would be increased 3,75 euros in the first year and 
on 4,5 euros in the second and 5 euros in the third year. The 
company with more aggressive adjustment rate would increase 
the dividends to 4 euros in the first year and 5,5 euros in the 
second year.
Raising the dividends in aforementioned manner managers smooth short run dividends 
to avoid taking any reverse action. If the earnings decline under transitory period 
managers do not have to cut dividends assuming that dividends do not yet fully reflect
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the level of the previous higher earnings and the current payout ratio is below the new, 
lower target payout ratio.
Using aggregated data on corporate earnings and dividends, Lintner tested his 
proposition empirically and found that the partial adjustment model predicted dividend 
payments more accurately than ”naive” models. Lintner finds that the model explains 
85% of the changes in dividends for his sample of companies. The average speed of 
adjustment is approximately 30% per year and the target payout is 50% of earnings.
Further support for the superiority of Lintner’s partial adjustment model was found by 
Fama and Babiak (1968). In addition to Lintner’s proposition, they investigated several 
other alternative dividend behaviour models using a sample of 201 firms with 17 years 
of data and concluded that Lintner’s model predicts dividends better than other models 
and managers increase dividends only after they are reasonably sure that they can 
permanently maintain them at the new level. For Lintner’s model they reported a mean 
speed of adjustment of 32% and the average target ratio of 52%. Later research on the 
partial adjustment model by Fama (1974) indicated results in line with studies of Lintner 
(1956) and, Fama and Babiak (1968).
A study by Partington (1984) confirmed that firms apparently targeted dividend payout 
ratios. Using a survey of 93 large companies, Partington determined that approximately 
60% of the firms had a clearly stated target payout ratio and the objective was to hand 
out about half of the firm’s earnings as dividends. Around one third of all firms had 
revised their targets considerably over the time period of 1965-1980 according to 
Partington.
A survey of management views on dividend policy was conducted by Baker, Farelly and 
Edelman (1985). Their objectives were to compare the determinants of dividend policy 
with Lintner’s model and to examine management’s perception of certain specific 
theoretical issues as well as to determine whether managers in different industries share 
similar views about the determinants of dividend policy. The tests were performed with 
318 useably responses to 15 closed-end statements about major determinants of 
corporate dividend policy and 18 closed-end statements about theoretical issues.
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The anticipated level of a firm’s earnings and the pattern of past dividends were 
considered most important by the three industry groups10 when ranked by the mean 
response. The evidence provided is in accordance with Lintner’s results that bottom line 
earnings are the predominant element which determines current changes in dividends 
and the other important factors which have more or less consciously and rationally 
influenced the decision are the growth and earnings prospects of the particular company 
(Lintner, 1956). The availability of cash was not directly acknowledged by Lintner but 
Baker, Farelly and Edelman found it as third important factor in determining dividend 
policy. A fourth major determinant was concern about maintaining or increasing stock 
price.
The respondents general belief about issues involving dividend policy supports the 
statements that a firm should avoid making changes that might soon have to be reversed 
and should strive to maintain an uninterrupted record of dividend payments. 
Respondents commonly agreed that a firm should have a target payout ratio and should 
periodically adjust the payout toward the target. The attitudes on theoretical issues 
revealed that managers’ opinions leaned towards the existence of information 
hypothesis. The level of agreement that the reasons for dividend policy changes should 
be adequately disclosed to investors was ranked very high. Other two statements 
associating with signalling effects were also generally agreed. The statements concerning 
dividend clientele effect produced somewhat mixed agreement but the existence of 
possible effect could not be rejected either.
The final objective of their study was to compare the industry influence on 
management’s attitudes. Baker, Farelly and Edelman reported that the opinions from the 
utility industry differed significantly from other two industries. They explained that the 
differences between the utilities and the other firms may be due to regulation on the 
utility industry which creates incentives for management to adopt a different payout 
policy than nonregulated firms.
10 Firms were selected from three industry groups which were utility, manufacturing and wholesale/retail.
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The interactions between the investment, financing and dividend decisions of the 1,000 
largest U.S. firms were surveyed by Pruitt and Gitman (1991). The evidence provided 
suggest that current and past years’ profits, the year-to-year variability of earnings, and 
the growth in earnings have the strongest influence on the amounts of dividends paid. 
Pruitt and Gitman also found that prior years’ dividends are an important influence on 
current dividends. This finding is completely in line with Lintner’s (1956) behavioural 
model and the observations of Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985). The inference from 
this is that respondents attempt to maintain a high degree of consistency in the level of 
their firm’s dividends. In addition, Pruitt and Gitman found that managers make the 
dividend decision independently of the firm’s investment and financing decisions.
The article of Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985) was updated by Baker and Powell 
(1998) and, Baker and Powell (1999). By renewing and extending the previous survey 
research on dividend policy they wanted to provide longitudinal comparisons between 
1983 and 1997 on the determinants of dividend policy as well add our understanding of 
why firms pay cash dividends. Their study of the factors influencing dividend policy 
decisions concentrated on three research questions: What factors are most important in 
influencing the dividend policy of firms paying cash dividends? Have these factors 
changed over time? and Do the views of managers about dividend determinants differ 
between a high payout, regulated industry and moderate payout, less regulated 
industries?
The sample of firms consisted of 603 U.S. corporations that were listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) by 1994 and had paid a cash dividend in at least one year 
during the 1994-1995 period. The inferences were drawn on 198 useable responses 
which showed that the level of current and expected future earnings as well as the pattern 
or continuity of past dividends were ranked the most important factors among all 
industry groups. Apparently most respondents believed that a firm’s dividend policy can 
affect its stock price because the concern about maintaining or increasing stock price was 
seen third important factor. Other important dividend policy determinants were the 
concern that a change may provide a false signal to investors and the stability of cash 
flows.
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The second research question addressed if these factors had changed over time. Baker 
and Powell compared the results in 1983 to their observations and concluded that the key 
determinants were much the same which suggest that the most important factors of 
dividend policy have remained comparably stable over time.
Their final interest was to see whether there appears to be any differences between these 
three types of industries.11 Baker and Powell reported that such differences seem to have 
decreased over time. Mainly this is due to regulatory changes which have forced utilities 
to function on competitive markets. This, in turn, has brought the risk level of utilities 
closer to other industries and explains why fewer differences appear to exist than in 
1983.
Baker and Powell (1999) used the same set of firms as on their earlier paper to extend 
investigation how corporate managers view dividend policy. Chief financial officers of 
these firms were asked to identify their level of agreement on 26 theoretical and 
empirical issues about dividend policy. The largest contribution of this study was to 
provide additional support for previous empirical work. Primarily the respondents agreed 
that a change in dividend policy affects the value of the firm which has already been 
acknowledged by Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985). Most of the respondents were 
proponents of dividend relevance and signalling effect was found to be the strongest 
candidate for explaining this relevance. The statements involving the tax-preference 
explanations received somewhat mixed agreements and the opinions towards Bird-in- 
the-Hand explanation were for the most part neutral.
2.4.1 Dividends as residual
Evidence that the managers base their dividend payout on rather well established 
practices and policies according to Linter’s study indicates that managers do not treat 
dividends as a passive residual. The residual theory posits that if dividends were seen as 
a by-product would managers first invest all cash to acceptable investment opportunities 
available to the firm and then distribute rest of the cash to the shareholders. Under
11 Again the industry types were utilities, manufacturing and retail/wholesale
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profitable investment opportunities the percentage of dividend payout would likely to be 
zero and, on the more mature markets where the firm is unable to find advantageous 
projects could the dividend payout reach 100%. Lintner’s study proposes that firm with 
abundant investment opportunities will pay a fair share of its current earnings to the 
shareholders as dividends and the projects that could not be financed with the funds 
available after dividends would go through a re-examination. If these projects still 
appeared to generate a rate of return above the company’s cost of capital, would the firm 
be justified to rise outside capital. As a result Lintner concluded that the pattem of 
dividend behaviour has very little direct effect on investment requirements.
The residual theory of dividends was under examination in the study of Ghosh and 
Woolridge (1988). They emphasise that when managers have adequate internal funds to 
support capital projects, the dividend payout plays a critical role in the implementation 
and realisation of the investment program. In the absence of any drop in earnings, a 
dividend cut or omission may be interpreted as a favourable signal to profitable growth 
opportunities, generating an upward stock price adjustment according to Ghosh and 
Woolridge (1988). They found some weak evidence for residual theory hypothesis that 
growth-motivated, noneamings-induced dividend cuts/omissions increase shareholders 




The sample of the survey consists of 91 Finnish corporations listed on the Helsinki Stock 
Exchange. More specifically they all are publicly quoted on the main list.[NAl]12 Only 
one company was left out of the survey because it was not listed at the end of 1998. The 
reason why I only chose companies from the main list is that the companies on the other 
lists are relatively small and their ownership structure is less diversified. In case of the 
small companies, there is a change that the manager owns a substantially large stake of 
the company and the dividends decisions may be influenced by manager’s personal 
interests. As far as I am concerned, the possible bias can be avoided by using larger 
companies with better diversified ownership structure.
3.2 Survey
I used a mail survey to obtain information about respondents’ views on specific dividend 
policy issues and factors influencing dividend policy decisions. The five-page 
questionnaire form consisting three parts was modelled after the mail questionnaires 
developed by Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985) and Baker and Powell (1998) and 
Baker and Powell (1999). Most of the questions were direct translations from English to 
Finnish but especially questions regarding taxes had to be reformed to fit better in 
Finnish tax environment.
In the first part the recipients were asked to indicate their personal opinion about the 
theoretical issues of dividend policy. These issues were categorised into five broad 
explanations of dividend policy: (1) the dividend irrelevance/relevance explanation, (2) 
the bird-in-the-hand explanation, (3) the tax-preference explanation, (4) the signalling 
explanation, and (5) the agency cost explanation. In addition, respondents were asked 
about how firms set dividend payments and their preference to institutional ownership. 
Also their awareness about stock repurchases as an alternative method to pay dividends
12 Others are New Market -, Pre- and I-lists
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was under examination. The first part included 29 closed-end statements and the 
respondents were given a five-point response scale where -2 = strongly against, -1 = 
somewhat against, 0 = neutral, 1 = somewhat agree, and 2 = strongly agree.
The second part of the questionnaire focuses on the factors which are most important in 
influencing the dividend policy of firms paying cash dividends. Respondents were asked 
to state their general opinion about 21 different factors on a four-point scale where the 
level of importance varies from no importance = 1, low importance = 2, moderate 
importance = 3 and, high importance = 4.
In the last section I asked recipients to identify their firm so that if a second round of 
mailing is needed I could avoid sending the survey to those firms which already have 
answered. Also, position or profession title of the respondents as well as a long-term 
target payout ratio (if any) on the scale from 0% to 100% were questioned. At the end of 
the questionnaire I asked if the respondent is actively involved in determining their 
firm’s dividend policy and then I offered to return the results from the study to all firms 
that have replied to the survey.
3.3 Gathering the data
After presenting the question form for final acceptance to Professor Martikainen (HSE), 
I mailed a cover letter requesting participation in this study along with a stamped, self- 
addressed return envelope and the survey to Investor Relation (IR) Directors of the 91 
firms in the beginning of April 1999. Before mailing the letters I attempted to get a 
personal contact with all of the IR-directors by calling them directly in order increase the 
response rate. A list which included all IR-persons of the corporations in Helsinki Stock 
Exchange was obtained from LTT Reasearch Ltd13. The cover letter requested that if the 
recipients were not actively involved in determining their firm’s dividend policy or the 
particular person can not be reached the survey should be given to someone in their 
company who was involved. Finally, I emphasised possible biases a low response rate
13 LTT-Tutkimus Oy
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would cause and then I requested respondents to return to questionnaire as soon as 
possible but no later than April 21st, 1999.
By April 21st the survey has resulted 36 responses producing a response rate of 39,6 %. 
After the deadline I once again called up the firms which yet had not responded and 
asked them to fill the question form. The second set of mailing took place in April 26th, 
1999. The survey was sent to all firms that had not replied excluding firms which had 
refused to participate to the survey.
A month later May 19th I had received 21 more responses yielding a response rate of 
62,6 % which can be considered satisfactory. Three of these 57 returned questionnaires 
had to be excluded from the final sample due to poorly filled questions. Some 
respondents did not answer every question, however, their incompleteness was not as 
systematic. Therefore, the rate of usable responses was little lower 59,3 %.
3.3 The limitations of the study
There are several limiting aspects in this research which should be noted. First, I mailed 
the survey according to my telephone conversation with each company. Despite several 
attempts I could not always reach the particular person which may lower the personal 
commitment to the survey.
Second, I acquired the views about dividend policy from one manager within each firm. 
However, most often it is not only one director who makes the dividend decisions, 
instead, there also are other participants involved as well. Because identifying all these 
participants is impractical, I used IR-director or other individual familiar with the firm’s 
dividend policy as a proxy for dividend policy makers.
Third, when taking the initial contact with the managers it became clear that they were 
extremely concerned about the length of the study and the effort it would require. I did 
not want discourage potential respondents by adding lengthy, time consuming open- 
ended questions. Thus, I chose only to use closed-ended questions and limit the length to
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five pages. Therefore, the survey involved a trade-off between the quantity of responses 
and the quality of information needed.
Fourth, a potential disadvantage oh the mail survey is that the researcher cannot be sure 
that the proper person supplied the information. There is always a possibility that a 
business executive may ask his secretary to fill out a form which requests his opinions. 
Also, unhonestly or in careless manner filled out question forms may bias the results.
Finally, the research findings could be affected by nonresponse bias. I used several 
precautionary steps to reduce this possibility. I tried to get individual managers 
personally involved by calling them directly. Also, personalised mailings and assurance 
of confidentiality of responses were applied. On the cover letter I informed respondents 
that possible low response rate would not allow to perform any statistical tests and the 




The target respondent was a person who is actively involved in decisions concerning 
company’s dividend policy. The most common position or title of the respondents was 
CFO/Finance Director (31,5 percent), followed by Chief Accountant (24,1 percent) and 
President/Vice President (20,4 percent). The more complete list of titles is in the Table 1 
below.






Chief Accountant 13 24,1 %
President/
Vice president 11 20,4 %
IR Director 4 7,4 %
Controller 3 5,6 %
Other 4 7,4 %
Anonymous 2 3,7 %
Total 54 100,0%
Table 1
Although I tried to emphasise the certain qualifications of the respondents on the cover 
letter and in the telephone conversations only 65,8 percent of these respondents said that 
they were actively involved in determining their firm’s dividend policy. One reason for 
low percentage could be that the question was not well-worded. It is the board of 
directors who proposes dividend pay out to shareholders who then vote to accept it. The 
idea behind the question was rather to find out if this person was actively involved 
preparing this proposition concerning firm’s dividend policy.
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4.2 The use of target payout ratios
Every respondent was requested to state their firm’s long term target payout ratio if they 
had any. Half of the firms (27) reported using a target payout. This is very similar to 
Partington (1984) who reported 59 percent for his Australian sample and a British study 
of Allen (1992) in which about 52 percent of the firms targeted payout ratios.
Most of the firms announced a single figure e.g. 50 % but some firms reported a range 
for their target payout e.g. 25 %-30 %. When the average target payout ratio was 
estimated I first calculated a arithmetic mean for these ranges. The average target payout 
between these firms was 40 percent. This estimate is upward biased because not all 
firms reported their target payout from net earnings after-tax basis. However, the error is 
small and does not change any general conclusions of the target payout. Values reported 
range from 25 up to 70 percent but they are heavily concentrated on a range between 30 
%-50 %. The more detailed distribution of reported target payout ratios is shown in 
Table 2.
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Frequency of use of target payouts
Payout classification Number Percentage
Firms using target payouts 27 50%
Firms not using target payouts 27 50%
Total 54 100%
Target payout ratio
<19,9% 0 0,0 %
20%-29,9% 2 7,4 %
30%-39,9% 9 33,3 %
40%-49,9% 8 29,6 %
50%-59,9% 7 25,9 %
60%-69,9% 0 0,0 %
70%-79,9% 1 3,7 %
>80% 0 0,0 %
Total 27 100,0%
Average target payout ratio 40,0 %
Std.dev 0,098
Max target payout ratio 70,0 %
Min target payout ratio 25,0 %
Table 2
In Allen’s (1992) study the distribution of target payout ratios were between a range 
from 0 % to 75% and the mean target payout was 34 %. A recent study of the payout 
policies of large UK companies by the Bank of England (1990) reported an average 
payout ratio of 35,8 %. In the Lintner’s study (1956) the ratios varied from a low of 20 
% to a high of 80 %, with 50 % the most common figure and the most of the other 
companies aiming at 40 % or 60 %. Also, Partington (1984) reported similar results. His 
sample of firms had a mean payout ratio of 49 %.
Table 3 shows the use of target payments across industrial sectors in order to assess any 
systematic differences across industries. By taking a quick over look there does not 





Percentage Use target 
payouts
Percentage Not use target 
payouts
Percentage
and Insurance 4 7,4 % 1 3,7 % 3 11,1 %
Investment 4 7,4 % 3 11,1 % 1 3,7 %
Transport 3 5,6 % 0 0,0 % 3 11,1 %
Trade 5 9,3 % 3 11,1 % 2 7,4 %
Other Sen/ices 3 5,6 % 3 11,1 % 0 0,0 %
Metal and Engineering 8 14,8% 5 18,5% 3 11,1 %
Forest Industry 2 3,7 % 1 3,7 % 1 3,7 %
Multi-Business 5 9,3 % 2 7,4 % 3 11,1 %
Energy 2 3,7 % 1 3,7 % 1 3,7 %
Food Industry 8 14,8% 3 11,1 % 5 18,5%
Construction 1 1,9% 0 0,0 % 1 3,7 %
T elecommunications 5 9,3 % 3 11,1 % 2 7,4 %
Chemicals 2 3,7 % 0 0,0 % 2 7,4 %
Media and publishing 1 1,9% 1 3,7 % 0 0,0 %
Other industries 1 1,9 % 1 3,7 % 0 0,0 %
Total 54 100,0% 27 100,0% 27 100,0%
Table 3
The three respondents from Other Services reported uniform usage of target payout 
ratios contrary to Transport where the three respondents denied using target payouts. 
Otherwise any systematic pattern of using target payouts could not be observed.
4.3 Issues involving dividend policy
Exhibit 1 provides the respondents’ opinions about 29 closed-end statements relating to 
dividend policy. I computed descriptive statistics for each of the 29 closed-end 
statements and ranked each statement by its mean score. If two or more statements 
received the same mean score then the ranks of these statements were added together 
and divided by the number of statements having the same mean score. For example, 
statements T2, T3 and T6 (T is used to describe a theoretical statement and the 
statement number refers to the order in which the statements appeared in the 
questionnaire) had the same mean score of 1,04 and their ranks would have been 4, 5 
and 6. I added their ranks (15) and divided it with the number of statements (3) to get 
the final rank (5) for the statements.
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I also divided the sample into two different groups depending on whether respondent is 
actively involved deciding firm’s dividend policy. This was done to see if there are 
differences in answers between these two groups.
4.3.1 The relationship between dividend policy and value
My first research question involved the relationship between dividends and value. Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) suggest that dividend policy has no effect on the value of the 
corporation in the world without taxes, transaction costs or other market imperfections. 
Table 4 shows that almost 90 percent of the respondents agreed that a change in 
dividend policy affects firm value (Tl) and somewhat less 70 percent believed that 
dividend policy also affects its cost of capital (T9).
More than 80 percent agreed that a firm’s investment, financing, and dividends 
decisions are interrelated (T8) which was supported by the view that over one half of the 
respondents strongly disagreed and more than 80 percent disagreed that a firm should 
view cash dividends as a residual after financing desired investments from earnings 
(T7). This is evidence that managers do not treat dividends as a passive residual as 
originally proposed by Lintner (1956) and, therefore, the argument suggested by Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) that the dividend decision is a residual decision does not gain 
much support. Also Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985) found that financing decisions 
should not be independent of a firm’s dividend decisions and dividend payouts are not 
seen as by-products. This was later confirmed when Baker and Powell (1998) re­
examined the previous study. They found that more than 88 percent of the respondents 
believed that a firm’s investment, financing, and dividend decisions are related. 
Dividends as residual, however, received somewhat mixed agreements in their study.
In Finland corporate managers emphasise that a firm should formulate its dividend 
policy to produce maximum value for shareholders (T6) because almost 50 percent 
strongly agreed this maximising principle. More than 70 percent of the total respondents 
agreed that an optimal dividend policy strikes balance between current dividend and 
future growth that maximises stock price (T5). Baker and Powell (1998) report even
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stronger agreement and conclude that these findings are clearly contrary to Miller and 
Modigliani’s (1961) proposition that in a real world without taxes no optimal dividend 
policy exists.
Disagree Neutral Agree
-2 -1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
1. A change in dividend policy affects 0,0% 3,7% 7,4% 61,1 % 27,8% 1,13 0,70 2 All
firm value. 0,0 % 5,7 % 8,6 % 57,1 % 28,6 % 1,09 0,78 2 I
0,0 % 0,0 % 5,3 % 68,4 % 26,3 % 1,21 0,54 4 N
8. A firm's investment, financing, and 1,9% 11,1 % 5,6% 37,0 % 44,4% 1,11 1,06 3 All
dividends decisions are interrelated 2,9 % 14,3% 2,9 % 31,4% 48,6 % 1,09 1,17 3 1
0,0% 5,3 % 10,5% 47,4 % 36,8 % 1,16 0,83 5 N
6. A firm should formulate its dividend 3,7% 13,0% 7,4% 27,8 % 48,1 % 1,04 1,20 5 All
policy to produce maximum value for 5,7 % 14,3% 5,7 % 31,4% 42,9 % 0,91 1,27 7 1
shareholders. 0,0 % 10,5 % 10,5% 21,1 % 57,9 % 1,26 1,05 3 N
5. An optimal dividend policy strikes a balance 0,0% 9,6% 19,2% 46,2% 25,0% 0,87 0,91 8 All
between current dividends and future growth 0,0% 2,9 % 23,5 % 41,2% 32,4 % 1,03 0,83 5 1
that maximises stock price. 0,0 % 22,2 % 11,1 % 55,6 % 11,1 % 0,56 0,98 14 N
9. A firm's dividend policy affects its cost 3,8% 15,4% 9,6% 46,2% 25,0% 0,73 1,12 10 All
of capital. 5,7% 20,0 % 2,9 % 51,4% 20,0% 0,60 1,19 14 1
0,0 % 5,9 % 23,5 % 35,3 % 35,3 % 1,00 0,94 8,5 N
7. A firm should view cash dividends as a 53,7% 29,6% 7,4% 5,6% 3,7% -1,24 1,06 29 All
residual after financing desired investments 57,1 % 25,7 % 2,9 % 8,6 % 5,7 % -1,20 1,21 29 1
from earnings. 47,4 % 36,8 % 15,8% 0,0 % 0,0 % -1,32 0,75 29 N
Table 4
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4.4 Explanations of dividend relevance
The second research objective was to find out which theoretical explanation of 
dividends, if any, managers tend to favour. The set of explanations included four 
popular explanations of dividend policy: tax/income clientele effect, the bird-in-the- 
hand, agency cost and signalling explanations.
4.4.1 Clientele effect explanation
The tax-induced clientele effect suggests that shareholders are attracted to certain types 
of divided paying stocks according to individuals’ tax circumstances. The higher the 
investor’s tax rate on dividends compared to capital gains, the more likely he or she is to 
want a firm retain its earnings and invest them internally to capture most of the earnings 
in form of capital gains.
There also are other explanations why investors may divide into clienteles and prefer 
different payout policies. A steady stream of income from dividends to live on and 
psychological reasons to avoid ”dip into capital” as well as the inconvenience reasons 
are often favoured explanations.
The possibility of a dividend clientele effect was first suggested by Miller and 
Modigliani (1961). It provides one potential explanation of companies’ observed 
reluctance to alter their dividend payout ratios. The result would be that shareholders 
would incur transactions costs in rearranging their portfolios to achieve desired income 




-2 -1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
17. A firm should be responsive to the 1,9% 3,8% 22,6 % 58,5% 13,2% 0,77 0,80 9 All
dividend preferences of its shareholders 0,0 % 2,9 % 20,6 % 61,8% 14,7% 0,88 0,69 8 1
5,3 % 5,3 % 26,3 % 52,6 % 10,5% 0,58 0,96 13 N
28. Dividend preferences vary between 0,0% 11,8% 23,5% 47,1 % 17,6% 0,71 0,90 11 All
shareholders depending on their age. 0,0 % 6,1 % 27,3 % 51,5% 15,2% 0,76 0,79 11 1
0,0 % 22,2 % 16,7% 38,9% 22,2 % 0,61 1,09 12 N
19. Stocks that pay high dividends attract 0,0% 14,3% 26,5% 36,7% 22,4% 0,67 0,99 13 All
tax-exempt entities. 0,0 % 12,9% 22,6 % 38,7 % 25,8 % 0,77 0,99 10 1
0,0 % 16,7 % 33,3 % 33,3 % 16,7 % 0,50 0,99 17,5 N
21. Investors prefer that a firm retains funds 1,9% 17,0 % 18,9% 43,4% 18,9% 0,60 1,04 15 All
over paying dividends if dividends are 2,9 % 25,7 % 14,3 % 42,9 % 14,3% 0,40 1,12 17 1
taxed heavier than capital gains. 0,0% 0,0 % 27,8 % 44,4 % 27,8 % 1,00 0,77 8,5 N
20. Investors are attracted to firms that have 1,9% 17,0% 22,6% 49,1 % 9,4% 0,47 0,95 18 All
dividend policies appropriate to the 0,0 % 20,6 % 23,5 % 44,1 % 11,8% 0,47 0,96 16 1
investors' particular tax circumstances. 5,3 % 10,5 % 21,1 % 57,9% 5,3 % 0,47 0,96 19 N
18. A firm cuts dividends in future if taxes on 9,6% 15,4% 21,2% 46,2% 7,7% 0,27 1,12 21 All
dividends are raised. 11,8% 20,6 % 17,6% 41,2% 8,8 % 0,15 1,21 22 1
5,6 % 5,6 % 27,8 % 55,6 % 5,6 % 0,50 0,92 17,5 N
Table 5
The results lean towards existence of clientele effect. Most respondents, approximately 
70 percent, believed that a firm should be responsive to the dividend preferences of its 
shareholders (T17) and that dividend preferences vary between shareholders depending 
on their age (T28). This finding is in line with Shefrin and Statman (1984) who found 
that preference for certain type of dividend paying stocks changes during investor 
lifecycle. Management’s responsiveness to its shareholder preferences was only slightly 
agreed on study of Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985). However, later Baker and Powell 
(1998) report somewhat stronger agreement.
The rest four statements (T18, T19, T20 and T21) account for tax-induced clienteles. It 
was not very surprising that the responses varied around neutral because results from 
empirical tests have been mixed. Although the taxation is quite different in US the 
results show a lot of similarities and the inconclusiveness is striking. The most common 
response was either somewhat agree or disagree or neutral. An interesting fact is the 
firms reluctance to cut dividends in future if taxes on dividends are raised (T18). This
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strongly suggest that even though managers try to acknowledge shareholders preferences 
the signalling effects and especially negative effects weigh on scale more than tax 
effects.
4.4.2 The Bird-in-the-Hand explanation
The survey contained two statements explaining the Bird-in-the-Hand theory: investors 
prefer certain, current dividends to possibly higher but riskier future dividends (T23) 
and investors prefer certain dividend stream to uncertain price appreciation (T22). The 
responses produced mixed results on these statements. In fact, over one quarter of the 
respondents had a neutral opinion about either statement while others either somewhat 
agreed or disagreed . The detailed results are in Table 6.
Disagree Neutral Agree
-2 -1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
23. Investors prefer certain, current 3,7% 24,1 % 27,8% 38,9% 5,6% 0,19 0,99 23 All
dividends to possibly higher but 5,7% 25,7 % 28,6 % 37,1 % 2,9 % 0,06 1,00 23 I
riskier future dividends. 0,0% 21,1 % 26,3 % 42,1 % 10,5% 0,42 0,96 20 N
22. Investors prefer certain dividend stream 9,3% 24,1 % 25,9% 29,6 % 11,1 % 0,09 1,17 24 All
to uncertain price appreciation. 11,4% 28,6 % 25,7 % 20,0 % 14,3% -0,03 1,25 24 I
5,3% 15,8% 26,3 % 47,4 % 5,3 % 0,32 1,00 22 N
Table 6
Generally these findings are consistent with Baker and Powell (!998) study where not 
very strong support have been found, not one way or the other.
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4.4.3 The agency explanation
With two statements involving the explanation of agency cost theory (T24 and T25) I 
wanted to test whether managers feel obliged to pay out dividends to reduce agency 
costs and to act as better agents in the view of outside shareholders. More than 50 
percent agreed that the payment of dividends serves as a bonding mechanism to 
encourage managers to act in the interest of outside shareholders (T25). This suggest 
that there may be a relationship between dividend payment and agency theory. However, 
the other statement that the payment of dividends forces a firm to seek more external 
financing, which subjects the firm to scrutiny of investors (T24) commanded a high 
level of disagreement.
The results are contrary to previous findings e.g. Baker and Powell (1998) found that 
over 90 percent of managers believed that dividend payments drive a firm to capital 
market and put the firm under greater surveillance. Although the responses whether 
managers act as better agents because of dividend payments received more mixed 
agreements they did not discard the agency explanation for paying dividends. The 
complete distribution of answers is provided in Table 7.
Disagree Neutral Agree
-2 -1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
25. The payment of dividends serves as a 3,9% 17,6% 27,5% 41,2% 9,8 % 0,35 1,02 20 All
bonding mechanism to encourage managers 3,0% 18,2% 24,2 % 45,5 % 9,1 % 0,39 1,00 18 I
to act in the interest of outside shareholders. 5,6 % 16,7% 33,3 % 33,3 % 11,1 % 0,28 1,07 23,5 N
24. The payment of dividends forces a firm 13,7% 41,2% 25,5% 19,6% 0,0% -0,49 0,97 28 All
to seek more external financing, which 14,7 % 47,1 % 23,5 % 14,7 % 0,0 % -0,62 0,92 28 I
subjects the firm to scrutiny of investors. 11,8% 29,4 % 29,4 % 29,4 % 0,0 % -0,24 1,03 27 N
Table 7
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4.4.4 The signalling explanation
Five statements involved information content or signalling effects (T2, T3, T10, Til 
and T12). The respondents showed the highest level of agreement (over 90 percent) with 
the notion that a firm should adequately disclose to investors its reasons for changing 
dividend policy (T12). More than 70 percent strongly agreed with the statement. 
Investors regard dividend changes as signals about a firm’s future prospects (T2) and a 
firm’s stock price usually rises when a firm unexpectedly increases its dividend or pays 
dividend for the first time (T3) both obtained equal high agreement. Respondents 
opinions leaned towards that investors use dividend announcements as information to 
assess a firm’s stock value (T10). The responses varied about whether dividend 
increases are ambiguous.
A study of Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985) ranks informing investors of dividend 
policy changes second highest of all. Also, Baker and Powell (1998) find it with highest 
rank among the statements concerning signalling. The other statements also seem follow 
quite consistently the same pattern as in recent studies. Taking all the evidence the 
responses suggest that managers generally believe that dividend changes provide new 
information to the market and investors use this information for assessing security 




-2 -1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
12. A firm should adequately disclose to 0,0% 3,7% 3,7% 20,4 % 72,2 % 1,61 0,74 1 All
Investors Its reasons for changing 0,0 % 5,7 % 2,9% 17,1 % 74,3 % 1,60 0,81 1 I
dividend policy. 0,0 % 0,0% 5,3 % 26,3 % 68,4 % 1,63 0,60 1 N
2. Investors regard dividend changes 0,0% 9,3% 7,4% 53,7% 29,6% 1,04 0,87 5 All
as signals about a firm's future 0,0 % 11,4% 5,7 % 48,6 % 34,3 % 1,06 0,94 4 I
prospects. 0,0 % 5,3 % 10,5% 63,2 % 21,1 % 1,00 0,75 8,5 N
3. A firm's stock price usually rises when a firm 0,0% 1,9% 13,0% 64,8% 20,4% 1,04 0,64 5 All
unexpectedly increases its dividend or pays 0,0 % 2,9 % 11,4% 65,7 % 20,0 % 1,03 0,66 6 I
dividend for the first time. 0,0 % 0,0 % 15,8% 63,2 % 21,1 % 1,05 0,62 6 N
10. Investors use dividend announcements as 0,0% 10,4% 25,0% 56,3% 8,3% 0,63 0,79 14 All
information to assess a firm's stock value. 0,0% 9,4 % 15,6% 65,6 % 9,4 % 0,75 0,76 12 1
0,0 % 12,5% 43,8 % 37,5 % 6,3 % 0,38 0,81 21 N
11. Dividend increases are ambiguous because 3,8% 15,1 % 17,0% 47,2% 17,0% 0,58 1,06 16 All
they can suggest future growth or a 2,9 % 20,6 % 8,8 % 47,1 % 20,6 % 0,62 1,13 13 1
lack of investment opportunities. 5,3% 5,3% 31,6% 47,4 % 10,5% 0,53 0,96 15,5 N
Table 8
4.4.5 Setting dividend payments
Another object of my interest was how the firms set the amount of dividends that they 
pay. Also preference for ownership structure and acceptance of stock repurchase as an 
alternative method to pay dividends were questioned. Six statements involved with 
setting a dividend payment. Apparently managers believed that firm should target 
payout ratios because over 80 percent agreed that a firm should have a target dividend 
payout ratio and periodically adjust the payout towards the target (T13). Also, the 
continuity of dividends were considered relatively important. These two findings 
confirm the results obtained by Lintner (1956) and Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985). 
On the other hand, the evidence surprisingly does not support the managerial perception 
reported by Lintner (1956) and Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985) as well as Baker and 
Powell (1998) that a firm should strive to maintain steady or modestly growing 
dividends (T16) or that a firm should avoid changing its regular dividend if that change 
might have to be reversed in a year or so (T14). A low rank for statement (T16) could be 
partly explained by poorly formed question where ”modestly” was not properly 
translated.
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The market places greater value on stable dividends than stable payout ratios (T4) and a 
firm’s new capital investment requirements generally have little effect on modifying its 
pattem of dividends (T26) showed high level of disagreement. The latter finding is 
inconsistent with Lintner’s study whereas former is supported by Lintner’s observation 
that most stockholders prefer a reasonably stable payout rate and that market puts a 
premium on stability or gradual growth in rate.
The firms were also asked if they would like to see institutional investors to own a large 
stake of their company (T27). The idea was to divide firms into two groups (those who 
prefer institutional investors and ones who do not) and compare the responses between 
these groups. Unfortunately, almost 50 % were indifferent whether their stocks are 
owned by institutions or small investors or they may consider both important and, 
therefore, have a neutral opinion.
Managers beliefs about a stock repurchase as an alternative method to pay dividends 
(T29) were inquired. The views were relatively evenly distributed but leaned towards 
moderate level of agreement. A complete list of answers are seen in Table 9.
68
Disagree Neutral Agree
-2 -1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
13. A firm should have a target dividend payout 3,7% 3,7% 11,1 % 48,1 % 33,3 % 1,04 0,97 5 All
ratio and periodically adjust the payout 5,7 % 5,7 % 17,1 % 42,9 % 28,6 % 0,83 1,10 9 I
toward the target. 0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 % 57,9 % 42,1 % 1.42 0,51 2 N
15. A firm should strive to maintain an 7,4% 14,8% 9,3% 38,9% 29,6% 0,69 1,26 12 All
uninterrupted record of dividend 11,4% 14,3% 11,4% 37,1 % 25,7 % 0,51 1,34 15 I
payments. 0,0% 15,8% 5,3 % 42,1 % 36,8 % 1,00 1,05 8,5 N
29. A stock repurchase is an alternative 14,8% 14,8% 7,4% 33,3% 29,6 % 0,48 1,44 17 All
method to pay dividends. 14,3% 20,0 % 5,7 % 37,1 % 22,9 % 0,34 1,41 21 I
15,8% 5,3 % 10,5 % 26,3 % 42,1 % 0,74 1,48 11 N
27. We would like to see institutional investor 0,0% 11,3% 47,2% 28,3 % 13,2% 0,43 0,87 19 All
to own a large stake of our company. 0,0 % 17,6% 41,2% 26,5 % 14,7% 0,38 0,95 19 I
0,0 % 0,0 % 57,9 % 31,6% 10,5% 0,53 0,70 15,5 N
14. A firm should avoid changing its regular 16,7% 18,5% 13,0% 29,6% 22,2% 0,22 1,42 22 All
dividend If that change might have to 14,3% 22,9 % 2,9 % 31,4% 28,6 % 0,37 1,48 20 I
be reversed in a year or so. 21,1 % 10,5% 31,6% 26,3 % 10,5% -0,05 1,31 25 N
16. A firm should strive to maintain steady or 7,7% 40,4 % 15,4% 26,9% 9,6% -0,10 1,18 25 All
modestly growing dividends. 11,8% 44,1 % 11,8% 26,5 % 5,9 % -0,29 1,17 26 I
0,0 % 33,3 % 22,2 % 27,8 % 16,7% 0,28 1,13 23,5 N
4. The market places greater value on stable 9,6% 28,8% 30,8% 26,9% 3,8% -0,13 1,05 26 All
dividends than stable payout ratios. 15,2% 21,2% 27,3 % 30,3 % 6,1 % -0,09 1,18 25 I
0,0 % 42,1 % 36,8 % 21,1 % 0,0 % -0,21 0,79 26 N
26. A firm's new capital Investment requirements 9,4% 49,1 % 17,0% 22,6% 1,9% -0,42 1,01 27 All
generally have little effect on modifying 11,4% 48,6 % 17,1 % 20,0 % 2,9 % -0,46 1,04 27 I
its pattern of dividends. 5,6 % 50,0 % 16,7% 27,8 % 0,0 % -0,33 0,97 28 N
Table 9
4.5 Factors influencing dividend policy decisions
The second objective of the study was to identify the factors which are most important 
in influencing the dividend policy of the firms paying cash dividend. Table 9 presents 
descriptive statistics showing the importance level of each of 22 factors considered by 
managers in setting their firm’s dividend policy. The factors are ranked according to 
their mean response and the statistics also present how high managers who are actively 
involved in the process as well as those who are not involved value the factors.
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None Low Moderate High
Factor 1 2 3 4 Mean Std.dev Rank
1. Level of current and past earnings 0,0 % 9,3 % 38,9 % 51,9% 3,43 0,66 1 All
0,0 % 11,4% 34,3 % 54,3 % 3,43 0,70 1 Involved
0,0 % 5,3 % 47,4 % 47,4 % 3,42 0,61 1 Not involved
16. Needs of current shareholders such 1,9% 9,3% 53,7 % 35,2 % 3,22 0,69 2 All
as the desire for current income 2,9 % 5,7 % 60,0 % 31,4% 3,20 0,68 2 Involved
0,0 % 21,1 % 36,8 % 42,1 % 3,21 0,79 3 Not involved
12. Continuity of past dividends 0,0 % 13,0 % 53,7 % 33,3 % 3,20 0,66 3 All
0,0 % 17,1 % 48,6 % 34,3 % 3,17 0,71 3 Involved
0,0 % 5,3 % 63,2 % 31,6% 3,26 0,56 2 Not involved
2. Expected future earnings 3,7 % 16,7% 44,4 % 35,2 % 3,11 0,82 4 All
5,7 % 14,3% 40,0 % 40,0 % 3,14 0,88 4 Involved
0,0 % 21,1 % 52,6 % 26,3 % 3,05 0,71 7 Not involved
21. Prestige associated paying 0,0% 18,9% 52,8 % 28,3 % 3,09 0,69 5 All
dividends 0,0 % 23,5 % 47,1 % 29,4 % 3,06 0,74 6 Involved
0,0 % 10,5% 63,2 % 26,3 % 3,16 0,60 5 Not involved
10. Concern about maintaining or 5,6 % 9,3 % 57,4 % 27,8 % 3,07 0,77 6 All
increasing stock price 5,7 % 5,7 % 57,1 % 31,4% 3,14 0,77 5 Involved
5,3 % 15,8 % 57,9 % 21,1 % 2,95 0,78 8 Not Involved
20. Desire to pay out, in the long run, a 1,9% 24,1 % 38,9 % 35,2 % 3,07 0,82 7 All
given fraction 2,9 % 25,7 % 37,1 % 34,3 % 3,03 0,86 7 Involved
0,0 % 21,1 % 42,1 % 36,8 % 3,16 0,76 4 Not Involved
18. Expected rate of return on assets 3,7 % 20,4 % 51,9% 24,1 % 2,96 0,78 8 All
5,7 % 22,9 % 48,6 % 22,9 % 2,89 0,83 9 Involved
0,0 % 15,8 % 57,9 % 26,3 % 3,11 0,66 6 Not involved
11. Concern that a dividend change 3,7% 29,6 % 40,7 % 25,9 % 2,89 0,84 9 All
may provide a false signal to 0,0 % 34,3 % 40,0 % 25,7 % 2,91 0,78 8 Involved
investors 10,5% 21,1 % 42,1 % 26,3 % 2,84 0,96 9 Not involved
3. Investment considerations such 3,7 % 35,2 % 46,3 % 14,8% 2,72 0,76 10 All
as the lack of profitable investment 2,9 % 28,6 % 54,3 % 14,3% 2,80 0,72 10 Involved
opportunities 5,3 % 47,4 % 31,6 % 15,8% 2,58 0,84 13 Not involved
9. Concern about maintaining a target 17,0 % 24,5 % 43,4 % 15,1 % 2,57 0,95 11 All
capital 14,3 % 22,9 % 51,4% 11,4% 2,60 0,88 11 Involved
22,2 % 27,8 % 27,8 % 22,2 % 2,50 1,10 15 Not involved
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15. Projections about the future state of 16,7% 31,5% 37,0 % 14,8% 2,50 0,95 12 All
the economy 20,0 % 34,3 % 34,3 % 11,4 % 2,37 0,94 14 Involved
10,5 % 26,3 % 42,1 % 21,1 % 2,74 0,93 10 Not involved
13. Stability of cash flows 17,0 % 24,5 % 50,9 % 7,5 % 2,49 0,87 13 All
20,6 % 26,5 % 47,1 % 5,9 % 2,38 0,89 13 Involved
10,5% 21,1 % 57,9 % 10,5% 2,68 0,82 11 Not involved
19. Desire to conform industry dividend 13,0 % 33,3 % 46,3 % 7,4 % 2,48 0,82 14 All
practice 17,1 % 31,4% 45,7 % 5,7 % 2,40 0,85 12 Involved
5,3 % 36,8 % 47,4 % 10,5% 2,63 0,76 12 Not involved
4. Financing considerations such as 18,5 % 33,3 % 38,9 % 9,3 % 2,39 0,90 15 All
the cost of raising external funds 22,9 % 31,4% 40,0% 5,7 % 2,29 0,89 16 Involved
10,5 % 36,8 % 36,8 % 15,8% 2,58 0,90 14 Not involved
7. Legal rules and constraints such as 32,0 % 28,0 % 14,0 % 26,0 % 2,34 1,19 16 All
paying dividends would impair 42,4 % 15,2% 12,1 % 30,3 % 2,30 1,31 15 Involved
11,8% 52,9 % 17,6% 17,6% 2,41 0,94 18 Not involved
17. Characteristics of current 24,1 % 31,5 % 35,2 % 9,3 % 2,30 0,94 17 All
shareholders such as their tax 25,7 % 34,3 % 34,3 % 5,7 % 2,20 0,90 17 Involved
positions 21,1 % 26,3 % 36,8 % 15,8% 2,47 1,02 17 Not involved
8. Control issues such as the firm's 31,5 % 29,6 % 31,5 % 7,4 % 2,15 0,96 18 All
ownership structure 42,9 % 25,7 % 22,9 % 8,6 % 1,97 1,01 20 Involved
10,5% 36,8 % 47,4 % 5,3 % 2,47 0,77 16 Not involved
6. Liquidity constraints such as 35,8 % 28,3 % 28,3 % 7,5 % 2,08 0,98 19 All
the availability of cash 40,0 % 25,7 % 25,7 % 8,6 % 2,03 1,01 18 Involved
27,8 % 33,3 % 33,3 % 5,6 % 2,17 0,92 19 Not involved
22. A possibility to repurchase firm's 35,2 % 29,6 % 27,8 % 7,4% 2,07 0,97 20 All
own shares 40,0 % 22,9 % 31,4 % 5,7 % 2,03 0,98 19 Involved
26,3 % 42,1 % 21,1 % 10,5% 2,16 0,96 20 Not involved
14. Preferences to pay dividends 43,4 % 35,8 % 15,1 % 5,7 % 1,83 0,89 21 All
instead of undertaking risky 48,6 % 34,3 % 14,3% 2,9 % 1,71 0,83 22 Involved
reinvestment 33,3 % 38,9 % 16,7% 11,1 % 2,06 1,00 21 Not involved
5. Contractual constraints such as 48,1 % 30,8 % 13,5 % 7,7 % 1,81 0,95 22 All
restrictions on debt 51,4% 31,4% 11,4% 5,7 % 1,71 0,89 21 Involved
41,2% 29,4 % 17,6% 11,8 % 2,00 1,06 22 Not involved
Table 10
The most important influence on the dividend policy was the level of current and past 
earnings (FI). This had a mean rating of 3,43 which suggest that it is very important 
factor for managers. Expected future earnings (F2) with a mean score of 3,11 was 
ranked fourth highest. Evidence suggest that past, current as well future earnings weigh 
heavily when managers form firms cash dividend policy. Comparing the results with
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recent research the similarity is overwhelming. Anticipated level of firm’s future 
earnings was the most highly ranked determinant in Baker, Farelly and Edelman’s study. 
The evidence provided by Fruit and Gitman (1991) suggest that current and past year’s 
profits among two other factors relating to earnings have the strongest influence on 
dividends paid. Baker and Powell (1998) who report that factors have changed little 
since the 1983 dividend survey find level of current and expected future earnings the 
most critical factor.
Clearly unexpected result was that the needs of current shareholders such as the desire 
for current income (FI6) was ranked second highest with a mean score of 3,22. This 
factor has not been directly acknowledged by any of the previous studies and Baker and 
Powell (1998) find it only ninth important determinant.
The next most important factor with average response of 3,2 was the continuity of past 
dividends (FI2). A high rank for pattern or continuity of past dividends was reported to 
have a significant influence in several studies.14
A fifth factor cited as important in determining dividend policy is the prestige associated 
paying dividends (F21). It had a mean response of 3,09. It is interesting to see that 
Finnish managers value this factor so high. Baker and Powell (1998) found that factor to 
have very little effect on influencing company’s dividend policy. In fact, the factor was 
second last in their survey. On the other hand, Kose and Williams (1985) reasoned that 
corporate insiders recognise the relationship between repeated dividends and their firm’s 
reputation and optimally smooth dividends over time relative to corporate cash inflows. 
That would explain why insiders might optimally pay a current dividend even if neither 
the firm nor its stockholders currently demand cash.
Although differences exist in dividend theories and empirical results about the 
relationship between dividend policy and firm value, the results provide more 
confirmation for managers belief that dividend policy can affect a market value of the 
firm because concern about maintaining or increasing stock price (F10) was ranked 
sixth with average score of 3,07. The finding is consistent with the pattem of responses
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in earlier studies. Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985) as well as Baker and Powell 
(1998) both find this factor among top four major determinants.
More or less unexpected was that liquidity constraints such as the availability of cash 
(F6) was ranked fourth lowest. Based on previous research I would have expected this 
factor to be a top achiever. Availability of cash and liquid funds have previously been 
highly ranked (see, for example, Baker, Farelly and Edelman, 1985; Allen, 1992; and 
Baker and Powell, 1998). Also, the stability of cash flows (F13) was somewhat lower 
place than expected because cash flows provide the basis for paying dividends. 
Management can have more confidence in maintaining a stable dividend policy or avoid 
the potential of having unexpected changes in dividends by having stable cash flows. On 
the other hand, managers in Finland seem to think that market appreciates stable payout 
ratios more than stable dividends and this explains the low rank of the factor.
Despite the fact that over 50 percent of the respondents believed that a stock repurchase 
is an alternative method to pay dividends only one third announced that a possibility to 
repurchase firm’s own shares (F22) has a moderate or high importance in influencing 
firm’s dividend policy.
4.6 Industry influence on dividend policy
To inspect industry influence I split the sample into two groups. One group contains a 
set of firms which can be considered operating in mature, stable markets and the other 
contains the firms which are operating in developing markets. The complete distribution 
of different industries are seen in Table 11.
14 Lintner (1956), Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985), Pruitt and Gitman (1991), Allen (1992) and Baker 
and Powell (1998)
73
Mature industries Developing industries
Investment Banking/Finance
T ransport and Insurance
Other Services Trade
Metal and Engineering Multi-Business








Next these two groups were divided into two subgroups depending on whether the 
respondent is actively involved in determining their firm’s dividend policy or not. Table 
12 shows how the firms were divided into these four groups.
Not Involved Involved Total
Developing industries 9 18 27
Stable industries 10 17 27
Total 19 35 54
Table 12
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4.6.1 Estimating differences between the groups
I used regression model to test if the responses to empirical and theoretical issues 
involving dividend policy differ significantly between these four groups. The regression 
formula is as follows:
y = ßo+ßx, +Ä*2 +А*з
if X, = x2 = 0 => У = ßo
x, = 1 and x2 = 0 => У = ßo +ß
x, = 0 and x2 = 1 У ~ ßo + ßi
x, = 1 and x2 = 1 =>y = A>+A+Ä+Ä
(1)
where x, is 0 if the firm belongs to the developing industry group and 1 if it belongs to 
the mature industry group, and x2 is 1 if the respondent is actively involved in deciding 
firm’s dividend policy or 0 if he is not involved. The last term x3 = x,x2 is 1 if the firm 
operates in mature industries and the respondent is actively involved in dividend policy 
issues, otherwise the term is 0.
The average response of manager not involved with decision making and operating in 
developing industries is estimated by parameter ß0. Estimated parameter ß shows the 
difference in responses between firms in x, groups, and parameter ß2 returns the 
difference in responses between managers who are actively involved and those who are 
not. The effect whether the responses of active managers differ in both mature and 
developing industries is caught by Д.
4.6.2 Regression results
The results of the regression tests show that the responses of the actively involved 
managers in mature and developing industry groups differ significantly at the 0,05 level
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for only 2 of the 29 statements (T21 and T22). This evidence suggests that a firm’s 
industry type has little influence on the views that managers have about theoretical and 
empirical issues involving dividend policy. The complete summary of the regression 









Investors prefer that a firm retains funds over paying dividends if dividends are taxed 
heavier than capital gains (T21) received uniform agreement among developing 
industries. However, on mature industries agreement varies significantly and the effect 
of management’s involvement in dividend decisions lowers the agreement considerably 
(Figure 1). On the other hand, it is somewhat expected that in the developing industries 
firms are more likely to retain funds in the company because of the nature of their 
business. The value of the firm is heavily concentrated on the future earnings power of 












Investors prefer certain dividend stream to uncertain price appreciation (T22) was the 
other statement which agreement differs significantly among the four groups of firms 
(Figure 2). In developing industries managers who are actively involved in dividend 
policy issues disagreed that investors prefer certain dividend stream. Logically the 
finding is not surprising because increasing the dividend today will not increase a firm’s 
value by value by reducing the riskiness of future cash flows.
4.7 Targeting payout ratio
Comparable procedure was accomplished to see whether there are differences in firms 
using a target payout ratio and those who are not using. The distribution how the firms 
are divided into four groups are seen in Table 13.
Not Involved Involved Total
Target payout ratio 6 21 27
No target payout ratio 13 14 27
Total 19 35 54
Table 13
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The regression statistics show that at 0,05 level of significance none of the groups 
differs from others according to their mean response to the statements. At significance 
level of 0,1 three statements (T8, Til and T26) received statistically significant values. 
The complete set of statistics is seen on the Exhibit 2.
Taken together, regardless of breaking the sample into different groups using two 
independent methods the regression results were not able to show any systematic 
differences among these groups of firms. This evidence suggests that managers who are 
actively involved in determining their firm’s dividend policy as well those who are not 
view the theoretical and empirical issues transmitted by the academic literature in the 
same manner regardless of the industry type. Also similar results were obtained when 
sample was split into groups based on using a target payout ratio which further confirms 
the findings that managers have uniform opinions about the statements.
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5. Concluding remarks
The objective of the paper was to examine the dividend policy views of corporate 
managers of listed Finnish companies and also to provide insight into the dividend 
decision making in these companies. Several conclusions about dividend policy may be 
drawn from the findings of this survey.
First, one half of the companies reported that they use target payout ratios which is very 
similar compared to findings from other foreign studies. However, the average target 
payout ratio was a little lower (40 %) than expected. This could be due to a fact that 
Finnish companies have traditionally had high debt to equity ratio and now the 
companies may try to avoid increasing leverage. By reducing dividend payments/target 
payout the companies are able to finance their investments from earnings and probably 
to pay back outside debt which gives a better cushion for uncertain future.
Second, the relationship between dividend policy and value was under examination. 
Most of the respondents believed that dividend policy affects firm value which has been 
acknowledged by several foreign studies.
Third, of the four explanations for dividend relevance examined in this study, the 
respondents generally had the highest level of agreement with statements involving 
signalling. The respondents typically were most uncertain (neither agreed nor disagreed) 
about the statements involving the Bird-in-the-Hand and agency explanations of 
dividend relevance. Respondents generally agreed that investors divide into clienteles 
and their dividend preferences vary depending on their age. However, managers were 
uncertain about tax-induced clientele explanation.
Fourth, the results show that managers’ views on setting dividend payments today are 
consistent with those reported by managers interviewed by Lintner (1956) and Baker, 
Farelly and Edelman (1985). In particular, the respondents were highly concerned that a 
firm should have a target dividend payout ratio and periodically adjust the payout 
toward the target. Also, the results show that managers were concerned about the 
continuity of dividends.
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The second objective of the study was to identify the factors which are most important 
in influencing the dividend policy of the firms paying cash dividend. The evidence from 
this paper largely confirms previous evidence about the determinants of dividend policy. 
The most important factors influencing dividend policy in this survey were highly 
similar to those found by Lintner (1956) and Baker, Farelly and Edelman (1985).
The results show that the most important determinants of a firm’s dividend policy were 
the level of current and past earnings. Also continuity of past dividends and expected 
future earnings were highly ranked. Among six highest factors there were two 
unexpected factors. Needs of current shareholders such as the desire for current income 
and prestige associated paying dividends were surprise factors if compared to related 
studies abroad. Also the results confirm the finding that managers believe that dividend 
policy can affect the value of the firm because concern about maintaining or increasing 
stock price was ranked sixth highest.
Finally, I tested the opinions of the respondents from four different groups depending on 
whether managers are actively involved in dividend decision making and whether their 
company is operating on stable or developing markets. The results show few statistically 
significant differences among the 29 statements. I repeated the regression analysis by 
splitting the sample using different criteria. The companies were divided into four 
groups based on respondents involvement and whether a company uses target payout 





12. A firm should adequately disclose to 0,0%
investors its reasons for changing 0,0 %
dividend policy. 0,0 %
1. A change in dividend policy affects 0,0 %
firm value. 0,0 %
0,0 %
8. A firm's investment, financing, and 1,9%
dividends decisions are interrelated 2,9 %
0,0 %
6. A firm should formulate its dividend 3,7 %
policy to produce maximum value for 5,7 %
shareholders. 0,0 %
2. Investors regard dividend changes 0,0 %
as signals about a firm's future 0,0 %
prospects. 0,0 %
3. A firm's stock price usually rises when a firm 0,0 %
unexpectedly increases its dividend or pays 0,0 %
dividend for the first time. 0,0 %
13. A firm should have a target dividend payout 3,7%
ratio and periodically adjust the payout 5,7 %
toward the target. 0,0 %
5. An optimal dividend policy strikes a balance 0,0 %
between current dividends and future growth 0,0 %
that maximises stock price. 0,0 %
17. A firm should be responsive to the 1,9%
dividend preferences of its shareholders 0,0 %
5,3%
9. A firm's dividend policy affects its cost 3,8 %
of capital. 5,7 %
0,0 %
28. Dividend preferences vary between 0,0 %
shareholders depending on their age. 0,0 %
0,0 %
15. A firm should strive to maintain an 7,4%
uninterrupted record of dividend 11,4%
payments. 0,0 %
19. Stocks that pay high dividends attract 0,0 %
tax-exempt entities. 0,0 %
0,0 %
-1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
3,7% 3,7 % 20,4 % 72,2 % 1,61 0,74 1 All
5,7 % 2,9 % 17,1 % 74,3 % 1,60 0,81 1 I
0,0 % 5,3 % 26,3 % 68,4 % 1,63 0,60 1 N
3,7% 7,4% 61,1 % 27,8 % 1,13 0,70 2 All
5,7 % 8,6 % 57,1 % 28,6 % 1,09 0,78 2 I
0,0 % 5,3 % 68,4 % 26,3 % 1,21 0,54 4 N
11,1 % 5,6% 37,0% 44,4% 1,11 1,06 3 All
14,3% 2,9% 31,4% 48,6 % 1,09 1,17 3 I
5,3 % 10,5% 47,4 % 36,8 % 1,16 0,83 5 N
13,0% 7,4% 27,8% 48,1 % 1,04 1,20 5 All
14,3% 5,7 % 31,4% 42,9 % 0,91 1,27 7 I
10,5% 10,5% 21,1 % 57,9 % 1,26 1,05 3 N
9,3% 7,4% 53,7% 29,6% 1,04 0,87 5 All
11,4% 5,7% 48,6 % 34,3 % 1,06 0,94 4 I
5,3% 10,5% 63,2% 21,1 % 1,00 0,75 8,5 N
1,9% 13,0% 64,8% 20,4% 1,04 0,64 5 All
2,9 % 11,4% 65,7 % 20,0 % 1,03 0,66 6 I
0,0% 15,8% 63,2 % 21,1 % 1,05 0,62 6 N
3,7% 11,1 % 48,1 % 33,3% 1,04 0,97 5 All
5,7 % 17,1 % 42,9 % 28,6 % 0,83 1,10 9 I
0,0 % 0,0 % 57,9 % 42,1 % 1,42 0,51 2 N
9,6% 19,2% 46,2% 25,0% 0,87 0,91 8 All
2,9 % 23,5 % 41,2% 32,4 % 1,03 0,83 5 I
22,2 % 11,1 % 55,6 % 11,1 % 0,56 0,98 14 N
3,8% 22,6% 58,5% 13,2% 0,77 0,80 9 All
2,9 % 20,6 % 61,8% 14,7 % 0,88 0,69 8 I
5,3 % 26,3 % 52,6 % 10,5% 0,58 0,96 13 N
15,4% 9,6% 46,2% 25,0% 0,73 1,12 10 All
20,0 % 2,9 % 51,4% 20,0 % 0,60 1,19 14 I
5,9 % 23,5 % 35,3 % 35,3 % 1,00 0,94 8,5 N
11,8% 23,5 % 47,1 % 17,6% 0,71 0,90 11 All
6,1 % 27,3 % 51,5% 15,2% 0,76 0,79 11 I
22,2 % 16,7% 38,9 % 22,2 % 0,61 1,09 12 N
14,8% 9,3% 38,9 % 29,6 % 0,69 1,26 12 All
14,3% 11,4% 37,1 % 25,7 % 0,51 1,34 15 I
15,8% 5,3 % 42,1 % 36,8 % 1,00 1,05 8,5 N
14,3% 26,5 % 36,7% 22,4 % 0,67 0,99 13 All
12,9% 22,6 % 38,7 % 25,8 % 0,77 0,99 10 I
16,7% 33,3 % 33,3 % 16,7% 0,50 0,99 17,5 N
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-2 -1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
10. Investors use dividend announcements as 0,0% 10,4% 25,0% 56,3% 8,3% 0,63 0,79 14 All
information to assess a firm's stock value. 0,0 % 9,4 % 15,6% 65,6 % 9,4 % 0,75 0,76 12 I
0,0 % 12,5% 43,8 % 37,5 % 6,3 % 0,38 0,81 21 N
21. Investors prefer that a firm retains funds 1,9% 17,0% 18,9% 43,4% 18,9 % 0,60 1,04 15 All
over paying dividends if dividends are 2,9% 25,7 % 14,3 % 42,9 % 14,3% 0,40 1,12 17 I
taxed heavier than capital gains. 0,0 % 0,0 % 27,8 % 44,4 % 27,8 % 1,00 0,77 8,5 N
11. Dividend increases are ambiguous because 3,8% 15,1 % 17,0% 47,2% 17,0% 0,58 1,06 16 All
they can suggest future growth or a 2,9 % 20,6 % 8,8 % 47,1 % 20,6 % 0,62 1,13 13 I
lack of investment opportunities. 5,3 % 5,3 % 31,6% 47,4 % 10,5% 0,53 0,96 15,5 N
29. A stock repurchase is an alternative 14,8% 14,8% 7,4% 33,3% 29,6 % 0,48 1,44 17 All
method to pay dividends. 14,3% 20,0% 5,7 % 37,1 % 22,9 % 0,34 1,41 21 I
15,8% 5,3 % 10,5% 26,3 % 42,1 % 0,74 1,48 11 N
20. Investors are attracted to firms that have 1,9% 17,0% 22,6% 49,1 % 9,4% 0,47 0,95 18 All
dividend policies appropriate to the 0,0 % 20,6 % 23,5 % 44,1 % 11,8% 0,47 0,96 16 I
investors' particular tax circumstances. 5,3 % 10,5% 21,1 % 57,9 % 5,3 % 0,47 0,96 19 N
27. We would like to see institutional investor 0,0% 11,3% 47,2% 28,3% 13,2% 0,43 0,87 19 All
to own a large stake of our company. 0,0 % 17,6% 41,2% 26,5 % 14,7 % 0,38 0,95 19 I
0,0% 0,0 % 57,9 % 31,6% 10,5% 0,53 0,70 15,5 N
25. The payment of dividends serves as a 3,9% 17,6% 27,5% 41,2% 9,8% 0,35 1,02 20 All
bonding mechanism to encourage managers 3,0 % 18,2 % 24,2 % 45,5 % 9,1 % 0,39 1,00 18 I
to act in the interest of outside shareholders. 5,6 % 16,7% 33,3 % 33,3 % 11,1 % 0,28 1,07 23,5 N
18. A firm cuts dividends in future if taxes on 9,6% 15,4% 21,2% 46,2% 7,7% 0,27 1,12 21 All
dividends are raised. 11,8% 20,6 % 17,6% 41,2% 8,8 % 0,15 1,21 22 I
5,6 % 5,6% 27,8 % 55,6 % 5,6 % 0,50 0,92 17,5 N
14. A firm should avoid changing its regular 16,7% 18,5% 13,0% 29,6% 22,2% 0,22 1,42 22 All
dividend if that change might have to 14,3 % 22,9 % 2,9 % 31,4% 28,6 % 0,37 1,48 20 I
be reversed in a year or so. 21,1 % 10,5% 31,6% 26,3 % 10,5% -0,05 1,31 25 N
23. Investors prefer certain, current 3,7% 24,1 % 27,8% 38,9% 5,6% 0,19 0,99 23 All
dividends to possibly higher but 5,7 % 25,7 % 28,6 % 37,1 % 2,9 % 0,06 1,00 23 I
riskier future dividends. 0,0 % 21,1 % 26,3 % 42,1 % 10,5% 0,42 0,96 20 N
22. Investors prefer certain dividend stream 9,3% 24,1 % 25,9% 29,6% 11,1 % 0,09 1,17 24 All
to uncertain price appreciation. 11,4% 28,6 % 25,7 % 20,0 % 14,3 % -0,03 1,25 24 I
5,3 % 15,8% 26,3 % 47,4 % 5,3 % 0,32 1,00 22 N
16. A firm should strive to maintain steady or 7,7% 40,4% 15,4% 26,9% 9,6% -0,10 1,18 25 All
modestly growing dividends. 11,8% 44,1 % 11,8% 26,5 % 5,9 % -0,29 1,17 26 I
0,0 % 33,3 % 22,2 % 27,8 % 16,7% 0,28 1,13 23,5 N
4. The market places greater value on stable 9,6% 28,8% 30,8 % 26,9 % 3,8% -0,13 1,05 26 All
dividends than stable payout ratios. 15,2% 21,2% 27,3 % 30,3 % 6,1 % -0,09 1,18 25 I
0,0 % 42,1 % 36,8 % 21,1 % 0,0 % -0,21 0,79 26 N
26. A firm's new capital investment requirements 9,4% 49,1 % 17,0% 22,6% 1,9% -0,42 1,01 27 All
generally have little effect on modifying 11,4% 48,6 % 17,1 % 20,0 % 2,9 % -0,46 1,04 27 I
its pattern of dividends. 5,6 % 50,0 % 16,7% 27,8 % 0,0 % -0,33 0,97 28 N
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-2 -1 0 1 2 Mean Std.dev Rank
24. The payment of dividends forces a firm 13,7% 41,2% 25,5 % 19,6 % 0,0% -0,49 0,97 28 All
to seek more external financing, which 14,7% 47,1 % 23,5 % 14,7% 0,0 % -0,62 0,92 28 I
subjects the firm to scrutiny of investors. 11,8% 29,4 % 29,4 % 29,4 % 0,0 % -0,24 1,03 27 N
7. A firm should view cash dividends as a 53,7% 29,6% 7,4% 5,6% 3,7% -1,24 1,06 29 All
residual after financing desired investments 57,1 % 25,7 % 2,9 % 8,6 % 5,7 % -1,20 1,21 29 I









1. A change in dividend policy affects Beta 0 1,222 5,334 0,000 1,154 5,839 0,000
firm value. Beta 1 -0,022 -0,070 0,944 0,060 0,220 0,827
Beta 2 0,111 0,396 0,694 0,179 0,510 0,612
Beta 3 -0,488 -1,243 0,220 -0,394 -0,918 0,363
2. Investors regard dividend changes Beta 0 1,111 3,748 0,000 1,077 4,393 0,000
as signals about a firm's Beta 1 -0,211 -0,517 0,608 0,137 0,403 0,688
future prospects. Beta 2 -0,111 -0,306 0,761 -0,244 -0,558 0,579
Beta 3 0,329 0,648 0,520 -0,018 -0,034 0,973
3. A firm's stock price usually rises when a firm Beta 0 1,222 5,605 0,000 0,923 5,145 0,000
unexpectedly increases its dividend or pays Beta 1 -0,322 -1,072 0,289 0,220 0,882 0,382
dividend for the first time. Beta 2 -0,222 -0,832 0,409 0,410 1,285 0,205
Beta 3 0,381 1,021 0,312 -0,601 -1,542 0,129
4. The market places greater value on stable Beta 0 -0,444 -1,255 0,216 -0,154 -0,517 0,607
dividends than stable payout ratios. Beta 1 0,444 0,910 0,367 0,237 0,553 0,583
Beta 2 0,209 0,477 0,635 -0,179 -0,339 0,736
Beta 3 -0,147 -0,239 0,812 -0,094 -0,144 0,886
5. An optimal dividend policy strikes a balance Beta 0 0,556 1,840 0,072 0,615 2,531 0,015
between current dividends and future growth Beta 1 0,000 0,000 1,000 0,099 0,293 0,771
that maximises stock price. Beta 2 0,444 1,202 0,235 -0,215 -0,467 0,643
Beta 3 0,063 0,118 0,906 0,751 1,358 0,181
6. A firm should formulate its dividend Beta 0 1,667 4,197 0,000 1,077 3,214 0,002
policy to produce maximum value for Beta 1 -0,767 -1,401 0,167 -0,148 -0,319 0,751
shareholders. Beta 2 -0,889 -1,828 0,074 0,590 0,989 0,327
Beta 3 1,048 1,542 0,129 -0,614 -0,843 0,403
7. A firm should view cash dividends as a Beta 0 -1,556 -4,307 0,000 -1,231 -4,074 0,000
residual after financing desired investments Beta 1 0,456 0,915 0,365 0,088 0,210 0,835
from earnings. Beta 2 0,333 0,754 0,455 -0,269 -0,501 0,619
Beta 3 -0,410 -0,663 0,510 0,174 0,265 0,792
8. A firm's investment, financing, and Beta 0 0,889 2,525 0,015 0,923 3,143 0,003
dividends decisions are interrelated Beta 1 0,511 1,053 0,297 0,363 0,889 0,378
Beta 2 0,444 1,031 0,308 0,744 1,423 0,161
Beta 3 -1,021 -1,695 0,096 -1,077 -1,689 0,097
9. A firm's dividend policy affects its cost Beta 0 0,778 2,140 0,037 0,769 2,492 0,016
of capital. Beta 1 0,472 0,891 0,377 -0,198 -0,461 0,647
Beta 2 0,167 0,374 0,710 0,981 1,541 0,130
Beta 3 -1,181 -1,830 0,073 -0,933 -1,256 0,215
10. Investors use dividend announcements as Beta 0 0,750 2,793 0,008 0,417 1,821 0,075
information to assess a firm's stock value. Beta 1 -0,750 -1,975 0,055 0,298 0,955 0,345
Beta 2 0,063 0,190 0,850 -0,167 -0,364 0,717
Beta 3 0,625 1,344 0,186 0,230 0,428 0,671
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11. Dividend increases are ambiguous because Beta 0 0,333 0,930 0,357 0,231 0,789 0,434
they can suggest future growth or a Beta 1 0,367 0,742 0,462 0,555 1,366 0,178
lack of investment opportunities. Beta 2 0,078 0,177 0,860 0,936 1,798 0,078
Beta 3 0,045 0,073 0,942 -1,222 -1,917 0,061
12. A firm should adequately disclose to Beta 0 1,667 6,726 0,000 1,538 7,382 0,000
investors its reasons for changing Beta 1 -0,067 -0,195 0,846 -0,038 -0,133 0,895
dividend policy. Beta 2 0,111 0,366 0,716 0,295 0,795 0,430
Beta 3 -0,299 -0,706 0,484 -0,128 -0,283 0,778
13. A firm should have a target dividend payout Beta 0 1,556 4,957 0,000 1,308 5,394 0,000
ratio and periodically adjust the payout Beta 1 -0,256 -0,591 0,557 -1,022 -3,036 0,004
toward the target. Beta 2 -0,889 -2,313 0,025 0,359 0,832 0,409
Beta 3 0,589 1,096 0,278 0,546 1,037 0,305
14. A firm should avoid changing its regular Beta 0 -0,667 -1,430 0,159 -0,308 -0,782 0,438
dividend if that change might have to Beta 1 1,167 1,815 0,076 0,951 1,739 0,088
be reversed in a year or so. Beta 2 0,889 1,556 0,126 0,808 1,153 0,254
Beta 3 -0,859 -1,077 0,287 -1,260 -1,474 0,147
15. A firm should strive to maintain an Beta 0 0,556 1,413 0,164 0,769 2,280 0,027
uninterrupted record of dividend payments. Beta 1 0,844 1,558 0,126 0,698 -1,489 0,143
Beta 2 -0,500 -1,038 0,304 0,731 1,217 0,229
Beta 3 0,100 0,149 0,882 0,007 0,010 0,992
16. A fina should strive to maintain steady or Beta 0 0,222 0,566 0,574 0,077 0,241 0,811
modestly growing dividends. Beta 1 0,111 0,200 0,842 -0,615 -1,364 0,179
Beta 2 -0,575 -1,185 0,242 0,723 1,194 0,238
Beta 3 0,007 0,010 0,992 0,327 0,449 0,655
17. A firm should be responsive to the Beta 0 0,556 2,062 0,045 0,538 2,399 0,020
dividend preferences of its shareholders Beta 1 0,044 0,120 0,905 0,319 1,023 0,312
Beta 2 0,389 1,179 0,244 0,128 0,321 0,750
Beta 3 -0,176 -0,380 0,705 0,085 0,175 0,862
18. A firm cuts dividends in future if taxes on Beta 0 0,556 1,475 0,147 0,308 0,988 0,328
dividends are raised. Beta 1 -0,111 -0,209 0,836 0,000 0,000 1,000
Beta 2 -0,614 -1,319 0,193 0,692 1,172 0,247
Beta 3 0,523 0,794 0,431 0,952 -1,339 0,187
19. Stocks that pay high dividends attract Beta 0 0,333 1,043 0,302 0,308 1,139 0,261
tax-exempt entities. Beta 1 0,333 0,738 0,465 0,192 0,493 0,624
Beta 2 0,792 1,982 0,054 0,692 1,350 0,184
Beta 3 -1,058 -1,863 0,069 0,245 0,391 0,697
20. Investors are attracted to firms that have Beta 0 0,444 1,359 0,180 0,385 1,418 0,162
dividend policies appropriate to the Beta 1 0,056 0,123 0,902 0,044 0,117 0,908
investors' particular tax circumstances. Beta 2 0,000 0,000 1,000 0,282 0,585 0,562
Beta 3 0,000 0,000 1,000 0,211 0,357 0,723
21. Investors prefer that a firm retains Beta 0 0,667 2,026 0,048 0,769 2,749 0,008
funds over paying dividends if dividends Beta 1 0,667 1,432 0,158 -0,341 0,877 0,385
are taxed heavier than capital gains. Beta 2 0,000 0,000 1,000 0,831 1,565 0,124
Beta 3 -1,216 -2,122 0,039 0,878 -1,383 0,173
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22. Investors prefer certain dividend stream Beta 0 0,333 0,945 0,349 0,231 0,700 0,487
to uncertain price appreciation. Beta 1 -0,033 -0,069 0,946 -0,302 -0,660 0,513
Beta 2 -1,000 -2,315 0,025 0,269 0,459 0,648
Beta 3 1,347 2,231 0,030 -0,198 -0,276 0,784
23. Investors prefer certain, current dividends Beta 0 0,222 0,723 0,473 0,308 1,120 0,268
to possibly higher but riskier future dividends. Beta 1 0,378 0,892 0,377 -0,451 -1,181 0,243
Beta 2 -0,611 -1,624 0,111 0,359 0,734 0,466
Beta 3 0,541 1,028 0,309 -0,026 -0,043 0,966
24. The payment of dividends forces a film Beta 0 0,000 0,000 1,000 -0,154 -0,571 0,571
to seek more external financing, which Beta 1 -0,500 -1,064 0,293 -0,346 -0,925 0,360
subjects the firm to scrutiny of investors. Beta 2 -0,667 -1,689 0,098 -0,346 -0,623 0,536
Beta 3 0,604 1,050 0,299 0,146 0,225 0,823
25. The payment of dividends serves as a Beta 0 0,556 1,629 0,110 0,462 1,619 0,112
bonding mechanism to encourage managers Beta 1 -0,556 -1,152 0,255 0,038 0,097 0,923
to act in the interest of outside shareholders. Beta 2 -0,320 -0,759 0,452 -0,662 -1,223 0,227
Beta 3 0,883 1,472 0,148 0,477 0,734 0,467
26. A firm's new capital investment requirements Beta 0 -0.111 -0,324 0,747 0,000 0,000 1,000
generally have little effect on modifying Beta 1 -0,444 -0,917 0,364 -0,429 -1,131 0,264
its pattern of dividends. Beta 2 -0,333 -0,794 0,431 -1,200 -2,317 0,025
Beta 3 0,418 0,701 0,486 1,152 1,861 0,069
27. We would like to see institutional investor BetaO 0,667 2,266 0,028 0,462 1,909 0,062
to own a large stake of our company. Beta 1 -0,267 -0,658 0,514 -0,319 -0,949 0,347
Beta 2 -0,373 -1,024 0,311 0,205 0,477 0,636
Beta 3 0,443 0,876 0,385 0,202 0,384 0,703
28. Dividend preferences vary between Beta 0 1,000 3,490 0,001 0,769 3,038 0,004
shareholders depending on their age. Beta 1 -0,778 -1,919 0,061 0,000 0,000 1,000
Beta 2 0,062 0,175 0,862 -0,569 -1,185 0,242
Beta 3 0,186 0,369 0,714 0,550 0,948 0,348
29. A stock repurchase is an alternative Beta 0 0,222 0,723 0,473 1,077 2,715 0,009
method to pay dividends. Beta 1 0,378 0,892 0,377 -0,577 -1,048 0,300
Beta 2 -0,611 -1,624 0,111 -1,077 -1,526 0,133




Olen rahoituksen pääaineopiskelija Helsingin kauppakorkeakoulusta ja parhaillaan olen 
tekemässä pro gradu -tutkielmaani suomalaisten pörssiyritysen osinkopolitiikasta. 
Tarkoituksena on selvittää tekijät, joilla on suurin vaikutus pörssin päälistalla olevien 
yritysten osingonmaksuun. Lisäksi on tarkoitus tutkia kuinka yritysten johtajat, jotka tekevät 
ehdotuksen osingonjaosta, näkevät osinkopolitiikan vaikuttavan yritykseensä. Tuloksia 
Suomesta vertaillaan vastaaviin ulkomaisiin tutkimuksiin mahdollisten erojen 
selvittämiseksi. Tutkimus on osa kansainvälistä osinkotutkimusta, jonka kuuluisimpia 
tutkijoita on professori George Frankfurter Lousiana State yliopistosta.
Kyselykaavake on lähetetty puhelinkeskustelun perusteella yritykseen henkilölle, joka 
vaikuttaa aktiivisesti osingonmaksuehdotukseen. Mikäli kyselykaavake ei jostain syystä 
tavoita kysyseistä henkilöä toivomme teidät toimittavan kaavakkeen vastaavalle henkilölle.
Aikaisempien ulkomaisten tutkimusten perusteella saattaa palautusprosentti jäädä alhaiseksi, 
joten toivon teidän löytävän aikaa lomakkeen täyttämiseksi, jotta tuloksista voidaan saada 
tilastollisessa mielessä merkittäviä tuloksia. Luonnollisesti olen valmis lähettämään 
tutkimukseni tulokset niitä haluaville yrityksille, jotka ovat palauttaneet kyselelomakkeen. 
Kaikki vastaukset käsitellään luottamuksellisesti.
Kunnioittavasti,
Jussi Korvenoja Teppo Martikainen
kauppatieteiden yo kauppatieteiden tohtori
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Suomalaisten pörssiyritysten osinkotutkimus
Merkitse “X” seuraavien kysymysten kohdalle sen mukaan miten olet esitetyn kysymyksen 
puolesta tai sitä vastaan. Vastausvaihtoehtoja tulisi pitää jatkuvana vaihtoehtojen ryhmänä 
alkaen “Vahvasti vastaan” ja päättyen “Vahvasti puolesta”. Jos kysymykseen ei ole 
mielipidettä tai se ei vastaa nykyistä tilannetta, jätä kohta vastaamatta. Asettamalla “X” 
keskelle kohtaan “Neutraali” indikoidaan, että mielipide on tasapainossa eli ei olla 
kysymyksen puolesta eikä sitä vastaan.
1. Osinkopolitiikan muutos vaikuttaa 
yrityksen arvoon.
2. Sijoittajat pitävät osinkojen muutoksia 
signaaleina yrityksen tulevaisuuden 
näkymistä.
3. Yrityksen osakkeen hinta yleensä nousee, 
kun yritys odottamatta nostaa osinkojaan 
tai maksaa osinkoja ensimmäistä kertaa.
4. Markkinat antavat enemmän arvoa vakaille 
osingoille kuin vakaille Osinko Per Osake/Voitto 
Per Osake -suhteille (payout ratio).
5. Optimaalinen osinkopolitiikka too 
tasapainon nykyisten osinkojen ja 
tulevaisuuden kasvun välille, mikä 
maksimoi osakkeen hinnan.
6. Yrityksen tulisi muodostaa
osinkopolitiikkansa niin, että se tuottaisi 
maksimaalisen hyödyn 
osakkeenomistajilleen.
7. Yrityksen pitäisi nähdä osingot
jäänöseränä, jotka maksetaan vasta, kun 
halutut investoinnit ovat rahoitettu 
nykyisistä tuotoista.
I______ I______ I______ I______ I
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i______ i______ i______ i______ i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i_______i_______i_______i_______i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i______ i______ i______ i______ i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i_______i_______i_______i_______i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
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8. Yrityksen investointi-, rahoitus-ja 
osinkopäätökset ovat vuorovaikutuksessa 
keskenään.
9. Yrityksen osinkopolitiikka vaikuttaa 
pääoman kustannuksiin.
10. Sijoittajat hyödyntävät osinkoilmoitusta 
yrityksen osakkeen arvonmääritykseen.
11. Osinkojen nostot eivät ole yksiselitteisiä, 
koska ne voivat tarkoittaa tulevaisuuden 
kasvua tai investointimahdollisuuksien 
puutetta.
12. Yrityksen pitäisi riittävän selvästi 
ilmoittaa sijoittajille syyt osinkopolitiikan 
muutokselle.
13. Yrityksellä pitäisi olla tavoite Osinko Per 
Osake/Voitto Per Osake -Suhde ja Suhdetta pitäisi 
ajoittain sopeuttaa vastaamaan tavoitetta.
14. Yrityksen tulisi vähää muuttamasta 
säännöllistä osinkoa, jos muutos täytyisi 
peruuttaa lähitulevaisuudessa (n. 1 vuosi).
15. Yrityksen tulisi yrittää ylläpitää 
pitkäjänteistä, keskeytymätöntä historiaa 
osinkojen maksussa.
16. Yrityksen tulisi yrittää ylläpitää vakaita 
tai vaatimattomasti kasvavia osinkoja.
17. Yrityksen pitäisi huomioida 
osakkeenomistajien osinkopreferenssit.
18. Yritys vähentää tulevaisuudessa osinkojen 
maksua, jos osinkojen verotusta 
kiristetään.
19. Osakkeet, jotka maksavat korkeita 
osinkoja houkuttelevat verovapaita 
yhteisöjä.
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i______ i______ i______ i______ i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i______ i______ i______ i______ i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i______ i______ i______ i______ i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i______ i______ i______ i______ i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
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20. Sijoittajat ovat kiinostuneita yrityksistä, 
joiden osinkopolitiikka! tarjoavat 
sijoittajille sopivimmat verotusolosuhteet.
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
21. Sijoittajat pitävät parempana 
voittovarojen jättämistä yritykseen 
osinkojen sijasta, jos osinkoja verotetaan 
ankarammin kuin myyntivoittoja.
I______ I______ I______ I______ I
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
22. Sijoittajat pitävät parempana varmoja 
osinko virtoja epävarmojen osakkeen 
arvonnousujen sijaan.
23. Sijoittajat pitävät parempana varmoja 
nykyisiä osinkoja korkeampien, mutta 
riskillisempien tulevaisuuden osinkojen 
sijaan.
24. Osinkojen maksu pakottaa yrityksen 
etsimään enemmän ulkoista rahoitusta, 
mikä johtaa yrityksen lähempään 
tarkkailuun sijoittajien puolelta.
I______ I______ I______ I______ I
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
i______ i______ i______ i______ i
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
25. Osinkojen maksu palvelee sitouttavana 
tekijänä ja edistäen johtajien toimia 
ulkopuolisten osakkeenomistajien 
intressien mukaisesti.
I______ I______ I______ I______ I
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
26. Yrityksen uusilla
pääomainvestointivaatimuksilla on vähän I I I I I
vaikutusta osinkojen muodostumiseen. Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
27. Haluamme instutuutionaalisten sijoittajien
omistavan suuren osan osakkeistamme. 1--------- 1--------- 1--------- 1--------- 1
Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
28. Osinkopreferenssit vaihtelevat eri 
ikäryhmien välillä. Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkin verran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
29. Omien osakkeiden takaisinosto on 
vaihtoehtoinen menetelmä jalkaa osinkoa. Vahvasti Jonkin verran Jonkinverran Vahvasti
Vastaan Neutraali Puolesta
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Merkitse “X” seuraavien kysymysten kohdalle sen mukaan miten esitetty tekijä vaikuttaa 
yrityksenne osingon]akopäätökseen. Vastausvaihotehtoina on annettu neljä eri tärkeystasoa 
alkaen “ei vaikutusta” ja päättyen “erittäin tärkeä”




4. Rahoitukselliset näkökulmat kuten 
kustannukset ulkoisesta rahoituksesta
5. Sopimukselliset esteet kuten vieraan 
pääoman aiheuttamat rajoitteet
6. Likviditeettirajoitteet kuten käteisen 
riittävyys
7. Laillisuus säännökset ja rajoitteet, joita 
osinkojen maksu heikentäisi
8. Kontrollinäkökulmat kuten yrityksen 
omistusrakenne
9. Huoli ylläpitää tavoitepääoma
10. Huoli osakkeen hinnan säilyttämisestä 
tai sen nostamisesta
11. Huoli, että osinkojen muutos saattaa 





















































































14. Preferenssit maksaa mielummin 
osinkoa kuin toteuttaa riskinen 
uudelleeninvestointi
15. Ennusteet yleisestä taloudentilasta
16. Nykyisten osakkeenomistajien halu saada 
tuloja osinkoina
17. Nykyisten osakkeenomistajien 
tunnuspiirteet kuten heidän veroasemansa
18. Oman pääoman tuotto-odotukset
19. Halu noudattaa toimialan yleistä 
osingonmaksutapaa
20. Halu maksaa osinkoja pitkällä 
aikaperiodilla tietyn jakosuhteen verran
21. Arvostus, mitä osinkojen maksu tuo 
yritykselle




Jos yrityksellä on pitkän aikaperiodin
tavoite Osinko/voitto -suhde niin mikä se on?
(0%-100%)
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